Defining Iran

Some Islamists do appeal to Iranianism, but their notion of Iranianism is nothing but Islamism

Balatarin
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Defining Iran
by bparhami
24-Jul-2011
 

Defining Iran
Politics of Resistance
by Shabnam J. Holliday
Ashgate, 2011

I almost stopped reading this book after a few pages. Like most academic treatments of sociopolitical issues, the author begins with a dizzying array of definitions and terminology, sometimes weaving seemingly simple concepts into undecipherable webs of words. Witness the following passage from the middle paragraph on p. 4:

“The dynamic of the Iranian national identity being constructed in relation to both an internal ‘other’ and an external ‘other’ and the politics of resistance embedded in these complex relationships can be understood in terms of a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic of discourses and counter-discourses of Iranian national identity. Some of these are or have been dominant or top-down. The ultimate aim is to illustrate that indeed Iranian national identity in the Khatami period is contested and that this is evident in the multiple discourses and counter-discourses. Analysing the articulation of national identity in terms of discourses allows the concurrent constructions of national identity to be examined in terms of a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic relationship.”

Gulp! As an engineer, I crave simplicity in oral and written communications and prefer the use of more-readily absorbed charts and tables in lieu of long, unstructured textual passages. If I were to write this book, I would start with the following diagram that shows the two components of the Iranian national identity according to the author: Iranianism (Iraniyat) and Islamism (Islamiyat). Different political personalities and groups can be placed on this coordinate system according to the relative weights they attach to Islamism and Iranianism in defining the national identity. I problably would have added a third dimension to the diagram that corresponds to democracy, with its value being higher near the middle of the diagram and virtually zero at both endpoints of Pahlavi and Khomeini. The democracy dimension is self-explanatory. What remains, then, is to define Iranianism and Islamism, with their various tints and interpretations.

Thanks for your comment. Here is the correct version of the diagram. I am still awaiting instructions on how to modify it in the body of the review.

  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Iranianism
| * Pahlavi
|
|
| * Mousavi/Karoubi
| * Khatami
| * Rafsanjani
|
| * Khomeini/Khamenei
|
Islamism

Iranianism does not have a single interpretation. Pahlavi’s version was based on the ancient Achaemenid era, with its grand civilization, often symbolized by Cyrus and Darius and given the geographic moniker “Persia.” Competing with the interpretation above is the Sassanid era “Iranshar” or “Iranzamin” (empire/land of the Aryans, roots of the modern name “Iran”), just prior to the Arab invasion. The latter interpretation represents a less grandiose, and more historically accessible, picture of an era when Iranians were already monotheistic under Zoroastrianism. To complicate the matter, some Islamists do appeal to Iranianism, but their notion of Iranianism is nothing but Islamism. For example, Khamenei is quoted as saying, “Today, the Iranian nation is proud of the fact that after the passage of fourteen centuries its culture, language and customs and practices are part of our culture and in this regard, being national is tantamount to being Islamic.” [p. 78]

Symmetrically, Islamism also has two flavors (at least): the strict conservative interpretation and the modern interpretation, as exemplified by Al-e Ahmad’s resistance to Westoxification (gharb-zadegi) and Shariati’s return-to-our-roots paradigm. Islamists with the two views agree on external enemies (West, Zionism/Israel, East) and one internal enemy (the former Shah and his current royalist followers), but each group views the other as the second internal enemy (“deviants” and “stone-ageists,” respectively). This is, of course, a highly simplified view, but bear with me a bit longer. Al-e Ahmad talked about urban Islam and dismissed the early tribal version. This is evident from his claim that Islam “became Islam when it reached the settled lands between the Tigris and the Euphrates.” Conservative clerics, on the other hand, emphasize the Islam practiced in Prophet Mohammad’s days.

From the discussion above, and despite all the simplifications made, we see the complexities inherent in coming to an agreement on an Iranian national identity that would be acceptable to all the arguing parties. We have the Iranianism/Islamism spectrum, represented in the diagram above, along with at least two interpretations each of Iranianism and Islamism, combined with various shades of democracy and Iran’s place in the world order.

I learned quite a bit from this book, and its references, perhaps because I went in with a rather limited knowledge of Iranianism and Islamism. I hope that my engineering-oriented summary above contributes to the understanding of the ongoing dialog about social and political issues of our motherland.

Balatarin
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Omid Parsi

V. S. Naipaul Had It Right First ...

by Omid Parsi on Thu Jul 28, 2011 09:18 PM PDT

V. S. Naipaul, one of the most profound thinkers and observers of our time once stated “Islam has had a calamitous effect on converted peoples. To be converted you have to destroy your past, destroy your history. You have to stamp on it, you have to say ‘my ancestral culture does not exist, it does not matter’….”

“Islam is in its origin an Arab religion. Everyone not an Arab who is a Muslim is a convert. Islam is not simply a matter of conscience or private belief. It makes imperial demands. A convert’s worldview alters. His holy places are in Arab lands. His sacred language is Arabic. His idea of history alters. He rejects his own: he becomes, whether he likes it or not, a part of the Arab story. The convert has to turn away from everything that is his.”

His two books on Islam, "Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey" (1981) and
"Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions among the Converted Peoples" (1998) were published long before Islam became an "issue", making him the one voice that the Left/Liberal/Multiculturalist/Marxist intellectual establishment loved to hate. That is until he was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature shortly after 9/11, somewhat in apology and in recognition for having foreseen and eloquently spoken the truth.

Any argument on this subject can only stand on the tall shoulders of Naipaul. The aforementioned books, written most engagingly as travel diaries, are worth more than any treatise in political science or anthropology dealing with the same subject. Just as Dostoyevsky foretold of Bolshevik horrors, Naipaul proved with his unsurpassed intellectual clarity and visionary courage that the intricacies of human condition are first grasped in literature, and then in social theory.


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bparhami

Ari Siletz: The two attributes

by bparhami on Mon Jul 25, 2011 12:48 AM PDT

You make a good point. The way I have drawn the diagram (the corrected one below, not the incorrectly formatted one in the review) assumes that more Iranianism implies less Islamism, and vice versa. This is sometimes called "normalization" in scientific jargon. Assuming that we can quantify these two attributes and a person or group has 100 units to "spend" on the attributes, then, for example, an Iranianism intensity of 95 implies an Islamic intensity of 5. This, I believe, is what the author presents, without using any quantification. I mentioned in passing that there is a third dimension (democracy), which is not shown in the diagram. So, of the 100 units, one can assign 40, say, to democracy, leaving only 60 for the other two attributes. The democracy dimension would then separate the various shades of Iranianism currently in play (royalists vs. republicans). Bear in mind that, as I wrote in the review, this is a highly simplified model, so one should not use it, except to visualize these various dimensions for better understanding of the wide spectrum of views on Iranian national identity.


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Ari Siletz

bparhami

by Ari Siletz on Mon Jul 25, 2011 12:27 AM PDT

One thing I find intersting about your diagram is that it may imply  that Islamism and Iraniansm can be independent variables. In other words making one smaller or bigger has no effect on the magnitude of the other. On the other hand a common view is that more of one identity implies less of the other. What is the book's view by your reading?


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bparhami

Ari Siletz: The corrected diagram

by bparhami on Mon Jul 25, 2011 12:13 AM PDT

Thanks for your comment. Here is the correct version of the diagram. I am still awaiting instructions on how to modify it in the body of the review.

     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Iranianism 
      |                                     * Pahlavi 
      | 
      | 
      |                    * Mousavi/Karoubi 
      |               * Khatami 
      |          * Rafsanjani  
      |       
      | * Khomeini/Khamenei 
      |
Islamism


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Ari Siletz

bparhami

by Ari Siletz on Sun Jul 24, 2011 11:40 PM PDT

Your diagram at least gives the degree of Iraniansm, so it's not bad. But in case reformatting is not possible, can you give coordiante pairs (scale of 0 to 9 on each axis)?


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bparhami

To Iran 2050 and other readers

by bparhami on Sun Jul 24, 2011 09:36 PM PDT

I am sorry that the diagram in my review got clobbered due to post-submission editing. It is supposed to represent a 2-dimensional space, with the horizontal axis representing "Iranianism" and the vertical axis corresponding to "Islamism." The sample points shown fall from close to the right end of the horizontal axis (almost all Iranianism, virtually no Islamism; e.g., Pahlavi) to close to the bottom end of the vertical axis (almost all Islamism, with negligible Iranianism; e.g., Khomeini/Khamenei). The other three points have various amounts of both attributes. Thus the diagram suggests, consistent with what appears in the book under discussion, that Iranianism and Islamism can indeed be combined. What is being argued by the various groups is which of the two attributes is primary (Iranianism or Islamism?), and how much emphasis should be placed on the secondary attribute.

I will contact the editor to see how I can correct the diagram. Meanwhile, please refer to my "Blog & Books" Web page below, under 2011/07/22 to see the correct version of the diagram.

//ece.ucsb.edu/~parhami/pers_blog.htm


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Ari Siletz

Thank you!

by Ari Siletz on Sun Jul 24, 2011 09:19 PM PDT

Your diagram should be on the back cover.  


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Iran 2050

This is a response I made

by Iran 2050 on Sun Jul 24, 2011 05:54 PM PDT

This is a response I made to a different thread which I see relative here:

 

Why do we have to have this conflict with in? Why does it have to be either or? Why can we be like any modern nation that does not see a conflict between their religious and national heritage?

 

The answer is because of our extremist systems. We went from one extreme prior to 1979 where it denied Iran’s beautiful Islamic heritage to another extreme post 1979 where the regime is denying Iran’s beautiful pre Islam heritage. Those systems have turned us extremists as well.

 

Now it feels like we have to decide. NO! As an Iranian, I love both aspects of my culture. Are we going to take Arabic words out of Golestan or Khayyam’s books and demolish Masjid Shah because their Islamic-Arabic? Are we going to demolish Takht Jamshid because it belongs to a non Islamic era in Iran? NO! All those are wrong.

 

Let’s think as modern 21st century people here. Let’s not fall into the trap of extreme religious or extreme nationalists. Let’s not let IRI’s action decide who we are. Let’s celebrate Iran as a concept. Let’s be a 21st century Iranian, not a medieval one.

 

 


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