MUBARAK

Mubarak heeds his people and steps down

Our Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's comments about the Egyption Uprising were SPOT ON!

Response to Questions for you

Response to Questions for you …

You pose an interesting series of questions. Let me take them one at a time.

First, you wonder whether the crowds will go home now that “reforms” are underway and Mubarak out of day-to-day running of the state. If the crowds were mature they would go home and adopt a wait and see attitude to see if this crisis could lead to evolution of the system without the bloodshed that a revolution will entail. There is naturally apprehension on the part of the crowds that if there is any let up on their part that the regime will begin a clandestine repression of dissent and arrest of provocateurs and ringleaders.

But masses can also behave irrationally – it is hard to suddenly stop demonstrating, to let go of the euphoria that has sustained the protests fro all the many days. The danger in this sort of “let’s keep pushing” is that new demands need to be created to keep fueling this unrest – It can be that Mubarak in Sharm al-Sheikh is not enough, that he has to leave Egypt; Suleiman has to leave Egypt, the military council has to give power to an interim government that will arrange for elections; demands can also be for trials and recrimination against the leading elite and officials.

My guess is that as long as the army in on streets, the crowds will continue to be there too.    

Second, you asked if it is fair to say that under pressure of such as a popular uprising, puppet dictators behave differently than non-puppet dictators, in that if things were left to Mubarak himself that he may have deemed it appropriate to kill a few thousand more people earlier. The courtship of dictators by foreign powers like the US or GB usually injects an element of anti-colonial or hyper-national into protests that might for the most part be an economic or political demand set. This naturally galvanizes the protestors around a very core concept of “national independence” or “national liberation” from foreign domination and exploitation. This transformation of the ethos of a crisis invariably makes the post-revolutionary regime anti-imperialist, to lash out against the interest of the foreign power that was the puppet master. This why the US moved very early on to distance itself from Mubarak, in order to avoid the day when the cry for political and economic reform in Egypt would become a cry against the US influence, with dire consequences for the US-Egyptian relations in the post-crisis period. The US influence was critical in making sure that the army stayed as a nationally respected institution, that concessions be made without bloodshed. The world watching and the shame of the leadership in Egypt too must be credited for keeping these relatively bloodless. Usually, the decision to kill or not kill is a question for the character of the leader. Whether the dictator is a puppet or not does not necessarily determine if he would be wanting to kill a few thousand in order to save the day.

 Third, you ask why we did not see any concessions from the Islamic Republic last year vis a vis the protests which had pretty tame demands, at least in the beginning? Could we say that the Islamic Republic's non-puppet state served it to make a decision to try to completely destroy and eliminate its critics through different, brutal methods and mechanisms? The reaction of IRI vis a vis the protests was not determined by the Republic being a non-puppet state. It is tempting to say that because the outside world does not seem to have any leverage against IRI that therefore the leadership can do as it pleases. There is a plenty of leverage that the outside world has on the state and the sanctions are just one reminder. The sole political leverage to which IRI would respond is that of Russia and perhaps China – and both of those regimes are brutal in their own way.   

In Iran, the IRI repressed the protests because it had the means to do it and feared not the consequence, internally or externally. It is also true that IRI, which has been made the bette noire of the family of nations has no shame/face or good name left to want to protect. There is a historical aspect of IRI’s situation that the Egyptian case does not entail. The Iranian protests began in response to the results of the presidential elections. The remedy for their demand would have been to demand change that can ensure fair and free elections. The stability or legitimacy of the supreme leadership was not ever in question, even though at times the call for death to dictator was heard here and there. In Egypt, the protests are against the post-colonial regime that came to power in 1952. In Iran, that “revolution” was had in 1951-53. The uprising in 1963 and later in 1978-79 were extension of the challenge to the monarchy in Iran. This is not to say that Egypr has not undergone turmoil of its own since 1952; it has and if assassination attempts are any indication, Mubarak has had his fair share of them; the state repression of Akhwan and the perennial boycott of the elections by various parties and groups bedeviled Mubarak for all these 30 years too. In IRI, it will not be the cry for political or feminist freedoms and reforms that will challenge the regime; it would have to be in my estimation an economic upheaval for better opportunities, jobs, social services, sanctity of contracts, protection of private property, and exiting of government from state-owned enterprises.       

Fourth, you ask if in IRI of today we are looking at a state that has quickly surpassed dictatorship and stepped into a state of religious and military fascism, where it is close to impossible for any unarmed popular uprising to topple it? This seems to be the case in IRI for now, but even then many a fascist regime has collapsed on its own weight and in the face of unarmed protests – Soviet Union is the best example of it. Some may argue that the last days of Pahlavi regime in Iran too pitted a military dictatorship against an unarmed protestors. How an army of conscripts behaves is a difficult thing to predict; but a revolutionary guard that is taken care of by the leadership will probably have the upper hand against an unarmed protest. Yet – two million marchers not fearing death can well overwhelm the defenders of the system; stoppages; strikes; slow-downs; sabotage and the like are still useable weapons in the arsenal of unarmed protestors.

Fifth, you stated that when the Shah thought that he was not supported by the US or the British, he stepped down and out. Assuming that he was able and willing, do you think the Shah could have prevented the Islamic Revolution by killing thousands of people? Killing of thousands may or may have not prevented the revolution. Not only the Islamists and secular oppositions groups were clamoring for the Shah’s head, the history of the Left’s discontent with the Pahlavi dated back to the late 1940s in remained unabated. The Islamists’ wanting blood in 1978-79 was inspired by the revenge for the killings in the hundred if not thousands in the uprising in 1963. I do not believe that the Shah left because he had lost the support of US and GB. I believe he left because he saw and heard first hand the dissatisfaction of the people with his regime. Only a few years earlier he had stated to CBS that the bond between me and my people is unbreakable. The entourage, itself disconnected from the masses, gave him the impression that all was honky-dory. In the final analysis, the Shah left because he was deeply disappointed in his countrymen. He did what any noble person would do – stay not where you are not welcome.

Mubarak is no longer mubarak

Mubarak is no longer mubarak. He hasn’t been so for quite sometime for Egyptians, and more recently for Washington. The question however is, who is? 

Are we going to see a reshuffling of the tried-and-true hand: the old guard stays, only another military strongman – a Mubarak lite? - replaces the corrupt octogenarian patriarch, who is being retired with a generous severance package– estimated to be $70 billion? Or, what has been happening in Egypt in recent weeks – irrespective of what we call it – is going to be the stepping-stone for a new Egypt?

Mobaraak (Father of nation) left: :):):)

I would love to party with Agyptians, but back in 1979 when I was 12, my uncle in his mid 40's told me to wait and see!

God, if there is one, bless him....

I am in my mid 40's now:

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkOHQy10eRE

P.S. I didn't listen to my uncle :(:(:(

Welcome Back!

It is great to read your articles. It seems so much was lost in the communication these last few weeks. I want to say that I wish that I was there to share their happiness that they feel today. Hope that they can do a better job than Iran did 30 years ago. Also, hope that Iraninans can see that they can make a change too.

I'm in awe of Egyptians and their civility

Almost 16 days of protest and No Death to this or death to that.

GONE

PBS, News Hour Last NIght

 "(...)

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Exactly. And that's the problem. And that's exactly the problem.

However, we have to recognize the fact that the Egyptian people don't have yet a variety of political voices to whom to listen and whom to follow. That has now to be encouraged. And I wish, for example, the Republican Institute, the Democratic Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, the human rights groups, would be engaged as soon as possible in promoting, in effect, the civic organization of the Egyptian people.

But the great uncertainty in all of this is that there could be a collision, a spark. Something sets things off, there's gunfire, lots of people get killed, and the whole thing erupts. And I have no way of predicting that.

I'm also perplexed, somewhat, by the reporting we're getting, because what strikes me about the reporting is that it's totally concentrated on one square in a large city of 15 million people, one square.

JIM LEHRER: Yes.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: And that's all we have seen. And we have seen it now for 10 days.

But what about the rest of the country? Even what about the rest of Cairo? What's happening there?

JIM LEHRER: Yes.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: I wish our correspondents would talk to some of the other people, because we don't really know what's going on. We have essentially a focus on a narrow, highly congested, combustible situation.

But we don't have a sense of what is really happening elsewhere in the country. In some places, it could be worse. For example, people have talked about Alexandria erupting. But, in many parts of the country, and maybe even in Cairo, it's much less volatile. So, we don't really have a good grasp, visually, and therefore intellectually, of what is really happening.

JIM LEHRER: You share that concern?

STEPHEN HADLEY: Yes. I think, though, tomorrow will be an interesting test, as Margaret Warner suggested.

(...)

So, the name of the game, in my judgment, is to the extent that we have any influence -- and we have to be very careful not to exaggerate it -- is to try to promote, advance a political process which transforms this is amorphous rising of the young people, the protesters and others, into a real participation in a political process, which means leaders become evident, programs begin to be articulated, and eventually the existing government, whoever is running it, and they sit down and define the rules of the game for a transition of power by elections.

That is exactly what happened in Poland in 18 - in 1989. The communist government, realizing that it can not crush Solidarity, was prepared to talk. Solidarity was willing to sit down. And then you had in effect a roundtable in which the opposition, led by trade union leader Walesa, assisted by intellectuals, with the church participating and the right wing and the left wing of the Communist Party together eventually arranging for elections.

That cannot happen in Egypt overnight, because you're dealing with an amorphous protest which isn't yet crystallized into some sort of programs and leaderships. And that's what we have to promote as much as we can from the outside, but quietly, and not by imperative commands publicly.

JIM LEHRER: Can that be done? Can the U.S. promote that effectively

//www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june11/egypt4_02-10.html

You can also watch the video.

well written!

:)

Stupid and Irresponsible CIA Outbursts are to blame for this

CIA chief tells Congress that US intel shows high likelihood Egypt's leader willleave office

"You may be sure that the Americans will commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are beyond imagination." - Charles de Gaulle

Questions for you

Thank you for another excellent read, as usual, full of new things to learn.

I wonder whether those Egyptians would go home now. Or has it been way too much fun on the main square, saying things they have been wanting to say for a few thousand years, or at least for 30 years, but were not allowed to say?

Watching Mubarak making some concessions in the form of reforms today, I wondered more than once whether it is fair to say that under pressure of such as a popular uprising, puppet dictators behave differently than non-puppet dictators? I mean if things were left to Mubarak himself, as they had been for 30 years, faced with last week's demonstrations, would he have deemed it appropriate to kill a few thousand more people earlier on to prevent this silly Tahrir Square masquerade from continuing for two whole weeks? Is it fair to say that in return for all the help he received from the US for 30 years, he now needs to heed the US' call for stepping down, or stepping aside, or stepping out?

If so, is that why we did not see any concessions from the Islamic Republic last year vis a vis the protests which had pretty tame demands, at least in the beginning? Could we say that the Islamic Republic's non-puppet state served it to make a decision to try to completely destroy and  eliminate its critics through different, brutal methods and mechanisms?

Or is it because in IRI of today, we are looking at a state that has quickly surpassed dictatorship and stepped into a state of religious and military fascism, where it is close to impossible for any unarmed popular uprising to topple it?

My last question is this: so much has been said about what the Shah of Iran did or didn't do vis a vis the street demonstrations in 1978 and 1979.  When the Shah thought that he was not supported by the US or the British, he stepped down and out.  Assuming that he was able and willing, do you think the Shah could have prevented the Islamic Revolution by killing thousands of people?