Shariati did not want this

Political Islam in Iran


Shariati did not want this
by bparhami

Ali Shari’ati and the Shaping of Political Islam in Iran
by Kingshuk Chatterjee
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2011


: 'Ali Shari’ati was highly influential in mobilizing the Iranian youth in the run-up to the Islamic Revolution, but his ideas, sidelined by the ruling regime in Iran, are losing their appeal in the emerging global village.

[Note: I have used the same spelling for names as the book’s author, mainly to reduce confusion when passages from the book are quoted.]

Many books have been published about Iran and Islam over the past three decades. I have studied a dozen or so such books, and have written reviews for some of them, including Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance (by Shabnam J. Holliday, Ashgate, 2011), which I reviewed a little over a month ago.

This one, written by an assistant professor of history at Calcutta University, is quite enlightening. The book consists of an introduction, seven numbered chapters, and a conclusion, and it ends with two appendices, on the history of Shi’ism and Shari’ati’s writings/lectures, and a glossary of Arabic and Persian terms. The book has an index, but it is rather incomplete. For example, neither “Safavid (Shi’i)” nor “Women (in Islam)” has an index entry.

Part of the book’s charm, compared with those by Iranian writers, is the author’s detachment from the various political groups that stand to gain from one or another interpretation of sociopolitical events leading to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. The down side of a non-Iranian author is the inevitable inaccuracies in translation and transliteration. For example, constitutionalists are called “mashruteh-khwahis” rather than “mashruteh-khwahs” [p. 31] and Shari’ati’s lecture series “What is Islam?” is referred to as “Islam che ast?” [p. 86]. There are also problems in the book’s editing and proofreading, as there are numerous instances of redundant or repeated terms/phrases throughout the text. Setting these criticisms aside, I did learn a great deal from this book.

Throughout the Pahlavi era (the reign of Reza Shah, who came to power by overthrowing the Qajars, and his son Mohammad Reza, who took over in 1941 when World War II allies forced his father to abdicate, and was kept in power via a CIA-led coup against the popular government of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953), the West had abundant influence in Iran. For example, Reza Shah’s abdication followed a BBC propaganda blitz, whose success took even the British by surprise [p. 34].

Tensions between religious fundamentalists, who believe in the primacy of Islam, and secular forces, that focus on Iranianism, while also allowing a role (though not a primary one) for Islam, has been part of the political scene in Iran for at least a century. To this date, the relative virtues of pre-Islamic vs. post-Islamic Iran are being hotly debated. Even Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was ambivalent about secularization. While his father pursued harsh policies aimed at removing the outward symbols of religiosity from society, MRP rolled back some components of the secularization agenda, in an effort to gain popularity[p. 40]. In this approach, he was driven, in part, by his fear of communism [p. 48].

Opposition to the Shah fell under three general groups or coalitions: Constitutionalists, led by Mohammad Mossadegh, Marxists who had Jalal Al-e Ahmad as a key spokesperson, and Islamists personified by Ruhollah Khomeini [p. 49]. The author elaborates on these three opposing forces in during the Pahlavi era in Chapter 2.

Even Mossadegh and his followers, the first of the three opposition groups just mentioned, acknowledged Islam as a force to be reckoned with and developed a narrative in this regard. Mossadegh argued that after the initial “epoch of revelation and inspiration,” during which divine and infallible interpretation of God’s guidance prevailed, the clergy kept themselves within the restraints of the laws made by legislators, rather than discovered or interpreted by fuqaha [p. 50]. He is quoted as saying: “I am an Iranian and a Muslim, and I shall fight as long as I am alive, against anything that threatens Islam and Iran” [p. 53]. Mossadegh’s downfall started when the common agenda that held secular and religious forces together fell apart. In this separation, Ali Shari’ati took the side of Mossadegh, rather than Kashani, who represented the religious front [p. 76].

The second opposition group, exemplified by Jalal Al-e Ahmad, was more accommodating of the clergy, allowing them some influence, if not participation. Al-e Ahmad is often characterized as a communist-turned-Islamist, but some still doubt his sincerity in embracing Islam, rather than simply use it as a tool for mobilizing the masses [p. 62]. In fact, his praise of Israel made him quite suspect in this regard: “For me as an easterner, Israel is a model, better than any other, of how to deal with the West. How to extract from its industries … how to take ammunition from it and spend the capital thus obtained to advance the country” [p. 63]. In his magnum opus, Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad writes: “We have failed to preserve our own historical and cultural character in the face of the onslaught of the machine. Indeed, we have been defeated. We have failed to take a resolute stand against this contemporary monster. Until we comprehend the essence, basis and philosophy of the western civilization, by only emulating the west outwardly and formally (embracing its machines) we shall be like the ass going about in a lion’s skin” [p. 60]. Admitting that we need to take certain things, but not everything, from the West, Al-e Ahmad continues: “From the west … we are looking for technology. Technology we have to import. We will also learn the science that goes with it. That in itself is not western; it is universal.”

The influence of the third opposition group, led by Khomeini and other clerics in his camp, is more recent. “The theory of a relentless struggle by the ‘ulema for ‘ten decades’ is mostly a myth.” It was Khomeini “who replaced this quietist orthodoxy [that prevailed till then] with a dynamic one, enunciating a doctrine of activist Islam” [p. 64].

Unlike Al-e Ahmad, “Shari’ati issued almost a blanket denunciation of the ‘ulema ... for having successfully robbed Islam of its dynamism by confining it to a deadening legalist system” [p. 2]. Beginning with Chapter 3, the author transitions from the three opposition groups just discussed to the role played by ‘Ali Shari’ati in the formation of the school of thought that brought about the current Islamic regime in Iran.

By combining his views, shaped at Sorbonne, with Islamic concepts and terminology, Shari’ati bridged the social divide between the traditional and modern segments of Iran’s youth, appealing to a broader spectrum of the society than anyone else [p. 117]. The fact that Shari’ati’s thoughts were influenced by Western thinkers was held against him by various opponents. “Subsequent claims by Shari’ati’s adherents of his familiarity with people like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre seem more to be exaggerations of casual acquaintances than facts, but the impact that the intellectual ambience of Paris in the 1960s had on Shari’ati was undeniable” [p. 77].

In time, Shari’ati’s reputation spread and his lectures and writings became highly popular, leading SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, to intensify its monitoring efforts that had begun immediately following his return to Iran and imprisonement for his involvement in anti-Shah demonstrations in Europe. For much of his career, Shari’ati avoided direct criticism of the regime, opting instead for an emphasis on the human element [p. 100]. When Shari’ati began to criticize the religious leadership in his lectures, SAVAK seized upon the chance of using him “as a stick with which to beat the ‘ulema.” This perhaps explains why Shari’ati was allowed to take on a teaching position at Mashhad University, despite his opposition and imprisonment.

The Shah later came to regret this leniency and completely banned Shari’ati’s lectures in the early 1970s [p. 101]. Following the Shah’s intensified crackdown on all opposition groups in the early to mid 1970s, Shari’ati was jailed again in 1973, put under house arrest in 1975, and eventually left Iran in secret in 1977, dying of natural causes the same year.

At various points during his life, Shari’ati was distrusted by the Shi’i clergy for his unorthodox religious views. For example, in response to a question in 1969, “[Shari’ati] argued that in the early days of Islam, when the meaning of Islam was not clear to most Muslims, they needed guidance from those entrusted with preserving the faith and its values—hence, the Shi’i concept of visayat. However, once Muslims became more aware of their faith and its values, the trusteeship of the faith devolves upon the community as a whole. The ummah then has the responsibility to elect its own leaders to execute that trust—hence, the Sunni principle of showra” [p. 103]. “I as an individual human being must choose whether to move forward with history and accelerate its determined course with the force of knowledge and science, or to stand with ignorance, egoism and opportunism in the face of history and be crushed” [p. 94].

Another example that infuriated the clergy was Shari'ati's statement that “Islam is not a new religion because, in fact, throughout history, there has only been one religion. … The Prophet of Islam was appointed to complete the movement which has existed throughout history in opposition to deception, falsehood, polytheism, discord, hypocrisy, aristocracy and class differences” [p. 107].

In a third and final example, his criticism of the clergy is stern and direct: “Under the guise of observing and honoring religious rites, in the name of glorifying great religious personalities, and behind the façade of seeking blessings and sanctification from the Holy Qur’an, these actors hide the true essence of the Qur’an and the true teachings of the leaders of Islam by preventing the people from understanding them” [p. 115].

Interestingly, two versions of Shari’ati’s writings are in circulation. “Those who support the status quo in favor of the state choose to highlight Shari’ati’s role as an ideologue of the Islamic Revolution, and expunge much of Shari’ati’s critiques of the clergy; those who seek to reform the establishment in a more liberal direction highlight his opposition to authoritarianism and clerical predominance in Islamic society” [p. 79].

Whereas Al-e Ahmad criticized pseudo-Westerners for promoting a false image of the West that did not exist even in the West itself, Shari’ati went a step further by pointing to the clergy as willing participants in this deception [p. 115]. Shari’ati formulated his thoughts in terms of the trilogies istibdad/istismar/istihmar (despotism/exploitation/duping) or zar/zoor/tazvir (gold, representing bazar’s merchant class, force, exerted by those holding political power, and deception, wielded by the clergy) [p. 93].

In a letter to Khomeini, Morteza Motahhari, who had taken on the role of attacking Shari’ati on behalf of the clergy, wrote: “[It] is not deniable that the only issue that the different groups—from the regime’s supporters to the communists, the Munafiqin-i Khalq … and some seemingly religious groups who are pro Shari’ati—all share this same desire, that is to damage fundamentally the ‘alim and to remove this obstacle from the scene … As a consequence of his [Shari’ati’s] teachings, a cleric is, in the eyes of today’s youth, worse than a security officer” [p. 149]. Motahhari was conflicted about non-clerical Islamists: He liked the fact that some such people, including those educated in the West, were representing Islam with a modern style that appealed to the youth, but he had misgivings about marginalization of the clergy by those who had an inadequate training in Islamic sciences [pp. 150-151]. Shari’ati was equally disliked by the communist Tudeh party and its sympathizers, who branded him as “an agent of the US, the CIA and the Pahlavi regime” [p. 117] and by the clergy, who considered him as “both ignorant and irreligious” [p. 118].

One of Shari’ati’s barbs against the clergy was the distinction he made between Alavid (associated with Imam ‘Ali) and Safavid Shi’isms. He maintained that the latter version, which was introduced to counter the power of the Ottoman Empire by making the Iranian Islam different and unique, was what the clergy practiced. According to him, the Safavid clergy invented a hadith about the marriage between Imam Hossein and the daughter of the last Sassanid king, Yazdegard, “to fuse the concept of monarchy with Imamate. … Instead of becoming involved in politics, Safavid fuqaha focused on writing about mensturation, ejaculation, the rituals of going to the toilet, ordinances concerning slavery and the responsibilities of the slave to the slave owner” [pp. 137-138]. And they invented the notions of taqiyeh (dissimulation), taqlid (emulation), and intezar (waiting for the hidden imam to reemerge) to justify their inaction [p. 138].

One of the more serious criticisms leveled at Shari’ati by the educated elites arose from his nearly total lack of attention to the roles of women in society. Of the 37 volumes of his collected works, only one was devoted to women (titled “Zan”), and he gave one lecture, “Fatima is Fatima,” on the topic, in which he focused on Fatima as the dutiful daughter and the silently suffering wife, something that did not please women’s rights advocates [p. 164]. Shari’ati’s friends and other supporters have claimed that his lack of emphasis on women’s issues was due to his not wanting to offend the wide spectrum of people, including many traditional families, who attended his lectures, and that he treated men and women equally in his private life [p. 164].

In the end, even though Sahri’ati’s efforts were instrumental in mobilizing the masses of youth against the Shah, and whereas some of his ideas found their way into the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the supremacy of the clergy, as reflected in the office of Rahbar (the Supreme Leader) and various other powerful councils and oversight oragans, make the current Islamic regime in Iran as foreign to Shari’ati’s way of thinking as it was to the vast majority of top-level mujtaheds who were against the clergy’s direct involvement in the machinery of government. Shari’ati’s rhetoric differed from those of Khomeini, Bazargan, and other Islamists, who advocated some sort of state apparatus that was constituted according to Islamic laws, in that he spoke of the personal responsibilities of a Muslim, rather than a centralized authority that operated in an Islamic fashion [p. 153].

In the Islamic Republic, which was established following the death of Shari’ati, the responsibility for carrying his banner fell to a younger generation that had been influenced by his lectures and writings. One of these was Abdolkarim Soroush, who rose rather quickly from a bureaucratic university post to the head of the Council for Cultural Revolution in charge of purging and reforming Iranian universities. Soroush later fell into the regime’s disfavor, leading to a ban on his teaching, writing, and public speaking in Iran [p. 182].

The language of Islamic politics was also used by the former president Khatami, but by then, much of Shari’ati’s fiery rhetoric had been neutralized and the younger generation was looking to other models, not to political Islam, for personal fulfillment and social engagement. In his final paragraph [p. 201], the author opines that “it is perhaps premature to assume that political Islam has failed, as Olivier Roy had done [in his 1996 book, The Failure of Political Islam]. The jury is still out.”

In this article, I have provided an extensive sample of the ideas and analyses presented in the book under review, but there is much more. I recommend the book to anyone who is curious about the roots of the Islamic Revolution and the relationships among various Islamic groups in and out of power in Iran.


more from bparhami
Omid Parsi

Islamic Intellectual is a Contradiction in Terms ...

by Omid Parsi on

Start with a lifelong faith in the universal sigbificance of the tear-jerking, gory tale of "Martydom" of some Arab thug named Imam Hossein (in Karbala!!), orated brainwash-style by a sadistic, self-righteous raghead to the lowest of the illiterate stinking masses in a lice-infested, dilapidated mosque in some godforsaken corner of Iran... Catapult yourself to "Le Sorbonne" in "Paris, France" (no joke!) and make your best retarded effort to quickly fit whatever you can or cannot "grasp" of the curriculum into all that your wholesome Hajji family "raised" you to "believe" ... Leave the dirty land of infidels and go back to Iran to lecture to the same stinking stupid masses in a "Hosseinieh", all the while dropping some names to make the stupefied audience believe you have hobnobbed with the likes of "Jean-Paul Sartre" (and "Franz Fanon"!!)... and there you have it: You are already a leading world renowned "Islamic Intellectual" who is not only going to bridge "East" and "West", but teach something to those unwashed infidels about the superiority of your "Imam Hossein" spirit!!

Here is how an "Islamic Scholar" might study "Japanese Cuisine":

1) Goes to a "Halaal/Chinese/Korean/Japanese" restaurant in the neighborhood of some Pakistani and North-African "brothers"...
2) Orders some Sushi-Sashimi Combo and a Green Tea from an Early Bird Specials pictorial menu.
3) Asks the bewildered Chinese waiter if the food is really "Halaal" and tries to enlighten the restaurant staff and Hispanic delivery boys all about what God has allowed his Creatures to eat.
4) Pockets the Chopsticks for later "study", and gets ready to manhandle the sushi plate with his bare hands...
5) Carefully separates the sticky rice from the slice of "Haraam" raw fish, all the while blessing the bite with a "Bismillah" here and a "Salavaat" there ...
6) Dips the bite-sized piece of rice into the sweetened Green Tea and ...

With scholars like this, who needs Baseejis and Retards?!!

Shazde Asdola Mirza

Back then - it was hip to have a romantic view of Islam

by Shazde Asdola Mirza on

اهل کاشانم 
روزگارم بد نیست
تکه نانی دارم، خرده هوشی، سر سوزن ذوقی
مادری دارم - بهتر از برگ درخت
دوستانی - بهتر از آب روان
و خدایی که دراین نزدیکی است
لای این شب بوها، پای آن کاج بلند
روی آگاهی آب، روی قانون گیاه

من مسلمانم
قبله ام، یک گل سرخ
جانمازم چشمه - مهرم نور
دشت سجاده من
من وضو با تپش پنجره ها می گیرم
در نمازم جریان دارد ماه، جریان دارد طیف
سنگ از پشت نمازم پیداست
همه ذرات نمازم متبلور شده است

من نمازم را وقتی می خوانم
که اذانش را باد گفته باشد - سر گلدسته سرو
من نمازم را پی تکبیره الاحرام علف می خوانم
پی قد قامت موج
کعبه ام بر لب آب
کعبه ام زیر اقاقی هاست
کعبه ام مثل نسیم، می رود باغ به باغ، می رود شهر به شهر
حجرالاسود من روشنی باغچه است



Shariati is the Iranian Timothy Leary

by bahmani on

To paraphrase Marx, "Religion is the Opium of the People". I find it interesting that according to modern statistics, after religion, Iranians are mostly addicted to drugs as well.

That should prove the value of religion in a modern space traveling society that Iran has become.

OK so I stretch it a bit to include Anousheh Ansari's taxi-ride into space, but if the manolo blahniks fit...

So the conclusion is that Iranians are not as special as we have hoped, nothing more than addicts to religion and opium (literally according to official IRI stats), and the deep desire to escape reality through self medication. Or prayer apparently.

Shariati, posing the argument of some kind of happy medium between drugs and self rule, merely the same argument that Timothy Leary made during the sixties, as he tried to get everyone to "expand your mind" via LSD. And that whole existential counter-cultural bent.

It certainly makes for a lot of interesting debate. And certainly we can spend a lot of time discussing what it would be like if everyone was high on religion and drugs, and what kind utopian society we could envision through the hallucinations provided by God and a nice hash-pipe.

But I would suggest that we simply don't have time for such nonsense, and we all really need to get back to work. Maybe over the weekend.

I wonder if that is why Church is on Sundays?

To read more bahmani posts visit: //


Wow! Parhami discovers Shariati!

by anglophile on

One of the entertaining features about our exiled intelegensia is their excitement in (re)-discovering an already well debated and thoroughly discovered personality or concept as is evident here in Professor Pahami's technical review of a book on Shari'ati. In this so called review, after providing us with an errata, as if this is yet another PhD thesis submitted to the good Professor for a viva, we are given a page-numbered quotated-excerpts from the book without any analytical discussion of the pros and cons of the arguments offered by the author in the quoted excerpt. This is the problem with taking upon the review of a book such as the subject of this article, with all its historical and coneptual inaacuracies, without having done the essential homework. This often happens when the reviewer comes from a diagonally opposite background to the subject of the book, as is the case of our good Professor, and in the course of his review, makes a number of pre-established assumptions without challenging the very roots of such assumptions. Well professor Parhami, thank you for the review but I look forward to seeing your informed review of this book in your new article: //


مذهب لعنتی




هیچ خردمندی متدین نیست،و هیچ متدینی خردمند


This guy was a pure Iranian Culture Hater,

by amirparvizforsecularmonarchy on

I hear that because of him the bacheh akhunds are not supportive of their parents.  What a Khaen.


Face of Khaen

by Siavash300 on

After 32 years oppression, torture, murder and destruction of our beloved homeland it is good to see the face of khaen who leaded our nation to this point.

Thanks for posting the face of one of these khaenin. Hope you introduce more of these people who destroyed our beautiful country from shah's days.


Masoud Kazemzadeh

Thank you for the book review

by Masoud Kazemzadeh on

Dear Mr. Parhami,

Thank you so much for your review of the book. I enjoyed reading it and benefitted from your excellent review.

One point; Ale-Ahmad WAS with the Tudeh Party. He left the TP and joined Niroyeh Sevvum [Third Force] lead by Khalil Maleki. Third Force was a Marxian democratic socialist party which was part of the JM. Then again, Ale-Ahmad left Niroyeh Sevvum and became nativist and embraced Khomeini and supported him. One weird fact about Ale Ahmad, with all his talks about returning to one’s authentic self, and his anti-western and anti-Americanism, he loved American Winston cigarets and whiskey and vodka.




What strange people we are

by fozolie on

making every charlatan into martyrs to the point that even foreigners think there is something behind their pernicious ideas


Mr. Fozolie

Anahid Hojjati

Dear Harpi-Eagle,

by Anahid Hojjati on

i must have expressed myself not correctly because i do agree with most of your comment. what i meant was that if there were no shariati, someone else would fill his spot, albeit perhaps not as well. 


Re: Shariati was one person

by Harpi-Eagle on

I think that's being naive, in certain historical periods, there are individuals who have a much bigger impact on the outcome than your run  of the mill common person following, a catalyst if you like.  And if we are to disregard  such persons, then are we to say that Dr. Goebbles had the same small impact of the common German during 1930s?  I think not. 

Why did I use Goebbles as an example, because he was the minister of propoganda for the Reich, just as your Shariatis and Al Ahmads were ambasadors of good will of the wonderful Islamic Utopia that we ended up with!!  So for sure Shariati had a much bigger impact than the simple minded Daneshkadeh Fanni student who was worshipping this man.

Now, if we want to talk about intelectuals with integrity, honesty, guts and eternal adoration for their country and nation rather than the Tazi Cult, we should talk about Ahmad Kasravi, may he rest in peace.  Enough said.

Payandeh Iran, our Ahuraie Fatherland

Tiger Lily


by Tiger Lily on



Mr. Pahrami

by Reality-Bites on

Your efforts are appreciated and welcomed. It is always worthwhile to have people, form whatever perspective, to take the trouble to read, analyze and review books for the benefit of others.

And surely no fair person can expect the reviewer not to have ANY personal view or at least a slant in their review. Thank you.

Anahid Hojjati

Mr. Parhami, your article is clear

by Anahid Hojjati on

that you were writing a book review but in my comment, I was addressing other commentators. Thanks for your article.


An important clarification

by bparhami on

The comments offered thus far do not require a response from me, as the article’s author. I will comment in future, only if clarifications are needed with regard to what I included in, or omitted from, my review. However, I am writing now to address a key point.

I submitted this piece as a “book review,” but the site editor included it under “ideas” and used a title of his choosing, perhaps creating the impression that I am arguing for or against Shari’ati’s ideas. Please view this as a mere book review, that is, a piece of “service” writing that helps you decide whether you would be interested in pursuing this book. If not, then I have saved you some expense and a lot of time. If so, then perhaps I have provided a service by introducing you to an information resource that you might have missed on your own.

Clearly, the books I choose to read or review are influenced by my biases and/or needs. In recent years, I have endeavored to fill a broad gap in my knowledge on history and philosophy. The gap is in part my own creation, because I tended to focus on my technical knowledge and career during my youth. It is also, in no small part, due to the fact that as Iranians, we were never exposed to an unbiased account of historical events. Our history books have always been Orwellian in their revisionism.

I know, you will be quick to point out that history is never unbiased, but I am talking in relative terms. In fact, I am now reading Nassim Taleb’s The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Random House, 2007), in which he argues, among other things, that historical explanations are distorted at best: “Consider the nature of information: of the millions, maybe even trillions, of small facts that prevail before an event occurs, only a few will turn out to be relevant later to your understanding of what happened. Because your memory is limited and filtered, you will be inclined to remember those data that subsequently match the facts …” [p. 12]. In other words, what actually caused an event may be burried among the pile of information that was removed from your consciousness as being irrelevant in the retrospective analyses.

Anahid Hojjati

Shariati was one person

by Anahid Hojjati on

If thousands of people believed him, it means that there was something wrong with mentality of those people. To put the blame all on Shariati is not correct. There were other intellectuals and people were free to follow them. They chose to follow Shariati. Demonizing Shariati is so pointless.  Besides, even back then, many read hi sbooks and did not become a follower. People who followed Shariati were "mostaed" of doing that any way, they were mostly from religious families who had not read many books and now as soon as Shariati came to the scene, they followed him. If they had not followed Shariati, they would have followed something quite similar. I used to know his daughters in school and talking to them, itseemed that they must have come from a loving family.


I, as an Iranian ...

by Harpi-Eagle on

Will never forgive Shariati for the damage he caused to our country.  By glorifying the Tazi Cult in his famous Hoseinieh Ershad, and intellectual seduction of many of our young prople of that era (1970s) he paved the road for traitors like Khomeini and Beheshti to hijack the 1979 revolution and subsequently rape the country and the nation. 

One of his favorite quotes was "Ali was the 1st socialist in the world" in an attempt to endearing Ali to all intellectuals including the Marxists at that time.  This he said about an Arab that had direct involvement in the slaughter of Iranian men and boys, taking our women and selling them as sex slaves in Madineh slave markets 1400 years ago.

No sir, I shall never forgive him, even though he, Yazdi, Ghotbzadeh, Bazargan and that other idiot, Bani Sadr were nothing but littlle toys that mullahs, specially Khomeini played in a devious political game.

Payandeh Iran, our Ahuraie Fatherland


Shariati was nothing but a political charlatan

by jasonrobardas on

      He was born and raised in a religious family . He was deeply religious himself . Through his  western education and familiarity of western thoughts and philisophies , he gave a modern facade to "Islam" and made it palatable to the youth . He popularized the concept of "Shahid and Shahid parasty" through his interpretation of the battle of "Karbala". Thus Hossein's defeat in  Karbala was not a tactical military  error . He chose to die ....blah.....Everyone of us can be a hossein ....blah blah blaah....

      Interestingly in his books , you find nothing concerning how his ideal Islamic society will be governed ...


Shariati was an akhoond....

by rain bow movment on

he was like an akhoond without a robe and turban,he has no knowledge in pollitcs,ecomamics,history,geopolitic.

he was just like Bazargan,yazdi,souroosh,mosavi,and other bunch of illitrate islamist+ masochist+sadist

There is no limit to stupidity & ignorance of this kind of men.

Shame on him

Tiger Lily

not quite

by Tiger Lily on

The revolutionary aspect can easily be explained via influences of Fanon and Sartre, including aspects of debatable ( and debated) justifications for violence (see e.g. Algeria),


the underlying ideology or rather attempt at an ideology is that of Shi'istic mysticism,( i.e. a predominantly socially ingrained  type of Islamic tradition together with a quasi-nationalistic location, ) being knitted together,( loosing many a loop and often quite loopy,) with the Frankfurt School's type of '  "transpositional" "integration"  ' of psycho-analysis with Marxism.

So the question is: is this "review" only about one subjective (the author of the blog) aspect of the book or does it claim to be an overall review? 


I don't know about Fred

by RostamZ on

But here is my take on the whole thing. Shariati was ideologue. You can not run a country by idealogy and you need solid, realistic and flexible point of view about everything. There is no point to argue if Shariati was right or wrong. Time and time it is proven the idealogs are always end up in the dust bin of history.


Can I cordially invite...

by پندارنیک on

... our dear friend, Fred, to post a comment here?