Victories of the FSA
Bassel Oudat / Al-Ahram (Egypt)
17-Aug-2012 (2 comments)

"There are more than 25,000 fighters in Aleppo," Omar Barakat, an FSA officer in Aleppo, told Al-Ahram Weekly. "About 90 per cent of them are military personnel who have defected, supported by hundreds of volunteers. It will be difficult for the regular army to overpower them because the FSA has prepared well for the type of urban warfare going on in Aleppo. Since Aleppo's rural areas and as far as the Turkish border are now under FSA control, arms supplies can reach it without much trouble."

Such arms include not only Kalashnikovs and M-60s, but also shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft weapons delivered in August, possibly tipping the balance in favour of the FSA.... the longer the uprising lasts the more organised the FSA is becoming, with its ranks being swelled with civilian volunteers. 

recommended by FG



Khamenei and the Iranian people take note!

by FG on

"When the regime decided to crackdown on the protesters in an attempt to halt the Syrian uprising, it could not have imagined the number of defections that would follow. Neither could it have imagined that the people would form an army to fight against the regular army, one whose ranks have been swelling by the day despite the immediate public execution of anyone deserting the army or security forces."


Lead story contains something I have seen anywhere before

by FG on

"The regime has tried to manipulate the disorganisation of the armed opposition by creating its own battalions under the banner of the FSA. These move covertly among the people, stirring up mayhem in order to turn local people against the FSA."


Have you heard anything about this?   If so, from what source would the personnel be drawn?  Those involved could hardly be foreigners.  

It would also be a risky assignment if carried out in FSA-held terriritory.  In regime territory, on the other hand, what would be the point (except perhaps to scare minorities).   I'm not sure such units would look plausible in areas not under FSA  control.   All of this would likely hamper effectiveness.


Over the past few months, the FSA has captured dozens of tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy guns, and anti-aircraft guns from regime forces, and these have helped it to cause immense damage to the regular army.

More than 20,000 personnel from the regular army and security and militia forces have been killed, and more than 600 tanks and some 500 armoured vehicles and military trucks have been damaged or destroyed. Seven helicopters have been sabotaged or shot down.


How reliable they are remains to be seen.  Even so, if anywhere near 20,000 troops have been killed, we must remember that casualties are usually many times that.  Then throw in defections.

Don't forget that--although the Syrian army in theory has 600,000 troops--many are confined to barracks for suspect loyalty.  What counts is the number of reliable troops whose numbers keep shrinking as the FSA grows.  Hence one-to-one comparison of force size is misleading.   If the regime loses its air monopoly or Russian support, it will fall in quick order.

Finally, the above figure does not include other negatives for the regime

--the psychological effect of having one's high officers defect or of hearing about the defections of well know public figures 

--the demoralizing effect of being forced to shell or fire on your own neighbors or fellow syrians and demolish the country.