FG

A Central Assumption of the regime's defenders

In subposts elsewhere the regime's defenders responded to these aricles either by the usual ad hominem argument ("mere western propaganda") or the usual outright lies (inflation and corruption are vastly overstated...Iranian workers never miss a paycheck...that their union leaders are never arrested and jailed, blah! blah!). 

Even if the regime's defenders admitted the charges were true, they would tell us the workers love the regime anyway.  That claim may appear to contradict human nature as we know it but truely there is a possible explanation--that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are so intrinsically and  "unconditionally" lovable they can get away with anything (the "central assumption" of regime defenders). 

The same goes for the rest of the iranian people with whom the regime supposedly remains "popular." 

Hence the majority of Iranians are not bothered in the slightest by the regime's so public beatings and arrests, by its show trials, by its persecution of journalists, human rights leaders, and defense attorneys, by its theft of their cell phones and rooftop satellites, by its obvious lies, by its "islamization" of universities, by its censorship, by its plainclothes housebreaking, by its disruptions of funerals, by its theft of corpses, by its mosque smashups, by its rigged elections or by its murders and rapes of prisoners. 

The truth is that the Iranian people just can't get enough.  They love it!  The only real question is "how could such a regime NOT be popular?" Unfortunately there are a few embarassing types who appear immune to "unconditional" love. 

Topping that list are Khamenei's estranged brother ( he finds the Supreme Leader's behavior repulsive, immoral and tyrannical), and members the Khoumeini family.  Oddly enough, the latter were offended when Khamenei had his death squads kill the founder's son.  The latter had made similar  embarassing criticisms openly and publically.  As a special case, he couldn't be silenced by the regime's "normal" means.  Therefore...

On that crime, I repeat what I've said before: it's the one regime crime that critics need to play up because even the majority of conservative clerics would be turned off. 

Why not do so?  What's to lose? The regime is going to brutalize reformers anyway no matter what they do.  Its credibility is so bad the people now (rightly) believe it is capable of any evil.

Can the Islamic Republic survive on the support of Taeb, Jafari, Janatti alone?   By ordering the murder of Khoumeini's son (such things could not occur without his permission), Khamenei burned bridges behind him.   Reform and political freedoms became unthinkable would mean a free press.  Thus Khamenei could never afford to allow it. 

Inevitably talented journalists would take advantage by looking into dark corners.  They have a veste interest in not making things up.  It's unlikely that what they would find would "clear" the Supreme Leader.  Otherwise, as is also true of honest and open elections, fair trials and the right to demonstrate peacefully, he'd have all the reason in the world to allow it.   Instead he forbids each of these.  Why?  Why?  Why, Mr. Khamenei?

REGIME IS REPEATING USSR HISTORICAL CYCLE BUT IN CONDENSED FORM

Outside its borders, successful revolutionaries despise Iran‘s regime so much that local Islamist leaders treat any praise from Iran as if were the kiss of death.  (“I am no Khomeini”and “We  don’t want to be like Iran.”)  

Inside Iran, what happened since 1979 resembles so closely what happened in Russia in the sixty five years after 1917 even if disillusionment set in far more quickly.  Both revolutions were captured by minority factions characterized by strong organization, ideological discipline and charismatic leadership. 

Lenin and Khoumeini both rushed from exile to seize control over a revolution that was well underway.  Each carefully eliminated all rival revolutionary factions to gain a monopoly of power.  In time both managed to convince a majority that they were “on the road to a glorious future.”   Massive brainwashing, glorious promises and--in Russia‘s case--physical isolation--were critical in doing so. 

Both regimes were doomed when subjects could no longer believe outlandish and unachievable promises.  Once people conclude they lived under systems that lead nowhere except a slow-burning hell, they are unlikely to tolerate it for long.  Where corruption, incompetence, dishonesty and brutality become so blatant, extensive and visible, a regime’s denials lose all effect. It is then that once respected leaders suffer bitter mockery.

Unlike the Russians, Iranians hardly needed 65 years to conclude, “We got stuck with a Loser!”  The less isolated a populace is, the quicker it will reach such conclusions.  In Iran as in the USSR, the rest of the world was on the road to the future while it was Russians/Iranians who were being left in the dust   Soviet leaders could conceal that reality much longer than Iran's ruling clique who lack a similar ability to isolate Iranians for many reasons.

What also made Iran’s regime really bad by comparison was the way other countries (S. Korea and China especially) who were once seen as third world flew past in such a historical short period (3 decades).  Iranians are too well aware that the gap growns wider each day this regime sticks around.  Iran‘s rulers can't hide it away or explain it.   

The Iranian public, frustrated and brutalized, already possess a deep hatred for Khamenei that goes far beyond the scorn and mockery directed at Brezhnev by the 1980s.   One reaons is Khamenei’s much greater brutality.  The second is Khamenei’s stomache-turning claims to sanctity based on his clerical status.  Such claims work against him by making his deeds are all the more despicable.   Most Iranians regard it as morally equivalent to being ruled by a pedophile priest.

Another observation: Even within 24 months of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, you could find a few substantial number of people on the far left who thought communism could still be a viable system with a few minor changes.   I'd imagine some Islamists elsewhere are still thinkinbg that way today.   

The collapse of Iran's grotesque regime followed by Iranian cheering and subsequent successes should awake all but the worst diehards, especially given the revelations likely to come out afterward.   As is the case with communism now, it's unimaginable that anyone will ever again be able to set up an Islamist theocracy, except in extremely backwards area like northwest Pakistan and Yemen.   

In the meantime Iranian thinkers--secular or otherwise--should have a major impact on the Islamic world afterwards, leading both an Islamic Reformation and an Enlightenment with its own Voltaires. That may put extra pressure on Saudi Arabia.