Bita Riazati
October 24, 2006
iranian.com

Surveillance is the act of watching or monitoring, when this is implemented through out a society, it ensures that the country is under watch from terrorists and in many instances it is to monitor social changes. In some countries surveillance technology is used for the safety of citizens while in other power hungry and conservative societies, security cameras, surveillance software in chat rooms, mobile phone bugging and electronic tagging is used for harassment and limiting one's freedom of expression under the banner of fighting "decadence".

The two countries I have chosen to compare consist of Iran and Australia. The reason to this selection is the major difference between these two country's surveillance policies and the way these states choose to monitor their citizens. While one country uses the technology to improve the human life style, the other one uses the same technology to create limitations for journalists, political activists, average citizens and any one who may have different opinions about the Government and its authorities.

Iran is an Islamic country, and interestingly the policies that have formed to protect the society are based on religious teachings. There is a religious saying in Islam that promotes this very act of [1] surveillance, that one should watch their fellow citizens and neighbours and make them aware of their wrong doings (Gandchi, S 2002). Therefore eavesdropping or bugging is part of a broader surveillance campaign to ensure citizens conform to 'Islamic teachings' as reinforced by the state law.

On the other hand we have Australia -- the country aims at using the technology for security, and protecting people's privacy online, and protecting them from terror and disasters. However Australia has recently implemented new laws that will breach one's privacy and thus, this breach clashes with the democratic nature of this country and the very notion of the freedom of expression (Warren, C 2006). In the next sections I will discuss what methods of surveillance is used in both countries, why they use a particular method of surveillance, how they are monitoring citizens, the effects and how the information that is gathered through surveillance is used for or against individuals.

Surveillance to fight "fraudulent conduct"
As human interactions increasingly shift from face-to face, proximate, and synchronous forms, to electronically mediated, distant and asynchronous forms, it is not surprising that elements of control found in all social relations are becoming more visible in electronically mediated interactions (Mansell, R, Silverstone, R 1996 -- p134).

Giddens introduces surveillance as a technology that takes the form of the accumulation of 'coded information', utilised to administer the activities of individuals by the direct supervision of people who have authority to monitor (Mansell, R, Silverstone, R 1996 -- p130). The environments of these 'coded information' can be designed to enable pervasive and transparent surveillance through tracking of usage patterns and long term storage of the information in logs, software applications  and databases (Mansell, R, Silverstone, R 1996 -- p133). The design of such a surveillance system in an online environment where users and their activities can be constantly monitored is proved useful as visible in the case of an Australian online stock market fraud. The authorities used new online surveillance systems that helped to detect the ramping of stock in an Internet chat room (O'Neill, M 2002).

However when this surveillance technology is misused it can become very self defeating. The overall phenomenon of surveillance and control of citizens is much larger than the basic involvement of public communication networks. Once a user enters a virtual public space by logging on to a computer network it is similar to entering a public space. In both proximate and virtual public spaces boundaries between public and private spaces are affected by the same rules that define one's privacy and infringement of these boundaries or the use of coercion in the process, represent violations of the basic ground rule (Mansell, R, Silverstone, R 1996 -- p134).

The violation of this rule can be seen when an Iranian man was approached by an online police in a queer chat room and the two parties organised a date to meet. The queer man by the name of Amir says he first rejected to communicate to this person, but when his descriptions matched someone he would be interested to meet, he provided the person with photographs and other information about himself. When he arrived at the promised meeting place he was handcuffed and taken to the Intelligence Ministry Headquarters, as he explains he denied: "I said I wasn't gay, and denied that this had been a gay rendezvous - but they showed me a printout of my messages and my picture." (Ireland, D 2005)

This is clearly an infringement of the [2] rule to privacy, however affected by the country's national constitution chat rooms are allowed to be monitored to detect "online offences" and will carry on heavy prosecution sentences (Ireland, D 2005).

Surveillance For National Security
Discussion of surveillance is almost always framed in terms of crime prevention and now being very much extended to preventing terrorism and privacy rights. After September 11, many governments around the world have passed legislation in the name of anti-terrorism that has further strengthen the right of a variety of security and other government bodies to gather and store information on residents.

On December 2004, Australian Federal Parliament passed the 'Surveillance Devices Bill' which significantly widened the circumstances in which Federal law enforcement agencies (other than ASIO, ASIS and DSD) can covertly use data, optical, listening and tracking surveillance devices. The new law also enables Federal Police to obtain "data surveillance" warrants permitting them to secretly install key logging devices in people's computers. (Surveillance laws and powers, no date)

The changes that are applied to use of surveillance methods by authorities in Australia have created huge concerns for journalists, following greater implications, as the new laws, passed by the Senate give law enforcement agencies the power to intercept phone calls, emails and text messages of any one (Warren, C 2006). I argue that this method is an extreme approach taken for surveillance laws as it poses a severe threat to [3] press freedom (Pearson, M 1997 -- p227). Journalists' sources are in danger as their conversations may be intercepted at any time. As the Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance federal secretary Christopher Warren put it "The new laws targets anyone who interacts with suspects of serious crime ... The rights of innocent third parties are jeopardised by this excessive and invasive law".

It is part of journalism's code of honour to respect the interviewee's right to privacy and confidentiality -- therefore the new Australian laws imposed by government's anti-terrorism campaigns are obliterating any professional right a journalist has, to protect their sources. This act of surveillance will have a great impact on delivery of news as fewer people will feel confident in speaking out, as there is little left in the law, to protect them. This means that the public will not know about crucial events in their society and thus will make an impact on democracy as journalists are limited to what they can report. MEAA representative, Warren confirms that "this law ... is unnecessary given there is already legislation in place to gather evidence in relation to crime suspects, there is no reason to take that a step further and inhibit civil rights and press freedom" (Warren, C 2006).

As Australia has engaged itself in phone tapping, and other monitoring instruments under the banner of anti-terrorism laws, Iran is also not far behind in using the technology to ensure implementation of governmental laws stay intact. Before the revolution that took place in 1979, the Shah secret police, SAVAK were responsible for monitoring the society and eliminating anyone who was of threat to the monarchy (Pike, J 2000). After the revolution, gate keeping and keeping citizens under surveillance increased even more so as national security and access to information started to be of major concern for Iranian authorities.

Foreign journalists that do corespondent work from Iran are on constant surveillance -- the authorities want to monitor suspicious activities, possible intelligence work and filtering of news if required, before information is exported to foreign media. Azadeh Moaveni an Iranian born, American journalist explains her reporting experience as "tormenting" as she was constantly under surveillance "to ensure I was not a CIA agent, and later to control my reporting and torment me as a person." She refused to make phone contacts with her sources as she was certain her phone's line was bugged and her cell phone was undoubtedly electronically tagged to monitor her movements and communications around the country. (Moaveni, A 2005)

Internet Content and User Surveillance
Technologists have dramatically changed the visual monitoring of people and electronic surveillance methods. Long-standing data trails have been consolidated. New data trails have been created, and online users' anonymous transactions are easily identified. Identification technologies are deployed in online communication systems in order to ensure that data trails are able to be consolidated efficiently. (Clarke, R 2001)

During 1998 official disclosures in Australia provided a glimpse into an email monitoring system referred to as 'Echelon'. This system was formed as part of the United Kingdom and United States' spy system and was designed for primarily non-military targets, such as governments, organizations and businesses. The system operated in virtually every country and intercepted fax, e-mail and telephone messages routinely and indiscriminately (Freedom of expression on the Internet 2004).

Furthermore in June 1999, the Australian Government approved the Broadcasting Services Amendment of Online Services Act which has forced Australian ISPs to remove objectionable material from Australian sites and to monitor and block access to similar sites overseas (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000 -- p48). One of the main reasons this surveillance practice was initiated in the introduced 1999 Internet Code of Practice was to provide "standards of confidentiality and [4]privacy to Australian online users" (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000 -- p48).

Privately-owned ISPs began to develop timidly in Iran in 1994, in the shadow of the big state-run ISP of the Data Communication Company of Iran (DCI), which is directly controlled by the Intelligence Ministry. Privately owned ISPs have to be approved by both the Intelligence Ministry and the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry and must have filters for websites and personal e-mail. All users are required to promise in writing not to access "non-Islamic" sites (Sedarat, F 2003). Proxy servers are used by authorities to track which computer terminals users were accessing which Web sites and for how long. Iranian authorities monitor individual Web use and users who request blocked sites receive a message on their screens warning that all access attempts are logged (Freedom of expression on the Internet 2004).

To further ensure that Iranian authorities can access any information and private database online, data [5] encryption is made illegal in Iran unless users provide the key to the authorities. Iranian Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, states that usage of any form of encryption " [6] for the purpose of exchanging information requires obtaining the permission of related authorities by registering the means of encryption's specifics, algorithm, and its key, as well as information about the involved parties, otherwise the use of encryption is not allowed." (Iran 2005)

As it is evident the notion of privacy, especially online privacy is non-existent in Iran, as citizens are told to make their information available to authorities anywhere and at anytime while in comparison to Internet Surveillance Act in Australia, which was originally introduced to "provide standards of confidentiality and privacy to Australian online users." (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000 -- p48)

Surveillance for economical and safety reasons
Advanced video surveillance systems have attracted a great deal of attention since they were used to track the movements of the terrorists responsible for the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground. According to National ICT Australia (NICTA), the challenge now is to develop systems that can help prevent attacks, rather than just record events as they unfold (NICTA Queensland developing technology to make Australia safe 2006).

NICTA and Australia's Centre of Excellence for Information and Communications Technology is developing surveillance projects that will help detect severe activities on the streets such as abuse, damage to property and terrorism before they actually occur (NICTA Queensland developing technology to make Australia safe 2006). NICTA's surveillance project will uses advanced surveillance technologies where computer systems assist humans to monitor surveillance footage all the time, such as in public transports. The aim is to enable operators to quickly and reliably identify specific people or suspicious activities.

The project that is currently undergoing tests and demonstrations is promised to feature advanced video management technologies based on systems used by the US Defense Force. Rather than operators looking at video monitors, live video surveillance will be presented in the form of a [7] 3D model and that way they can quickly move from camera to camera if they need to follow a person or moving vehicle (NICTA Queensland developing technology to make Australia safe 2006). NICTA's project will change the way people use technology in their everyday lives as it will also be used for Water Information Networks and Smart Transport and Roads.

On the same token, Iran is also investing heavily in CCTV not only to protect against terror activities but also to protect from commercial establishments (McCahill, M, Norris, C, Wood, D 2004). In Tehran, a city-wide network of cameras has been created, with each local police station receiving images from the six or more cameras in their local area. In addition there is a centralised control capable of receiving images from the entire network as well as images from the traffic control systems. There are also plans to extend the network to cover the rest of the police stations outside [8]Tehran (McCahill, M, Norris, C, Wood, D 2004).

Furthermore, as traffic is a huge problem for Tehran, urban officials are in discussions to introduce a method of resolving this issue -- to introduce fees for certain parts of the city areas where there is heavy traffic congestion. This is to be achieved through [9] electronic tagging (Traffic fee 2005) as it will be easy to identify each car on the street and they will be billed accordingly. That way it is possible to reduce vehicular traffic and save time, improve the public transport and metro networks.

Reflection
As it is presented in this document's discussions, it is obvious that surveillance technology is used by both countries as a tool to maintain control over flow of information and activity of citizens. Iran chooses to use surveillance technology to ensure anti-government activities are monitored and directly reported to responsible authorities. On the other hand, Australia is a democratic country where extreme measures to monitor the society for acts of terrorism is resulting in limiting freedom of expression, while members of the public especially journalists feel that quality and integrity of their profession is under threat by the newly proposed laws.

Due to Iran's current political conditions and global pressures, Iran is taking stronger measures towards security and policing. This is to monitor foreign activities inside and outside boarders in case there are any plans of attacks on the Iranian soil. There is not one single thing the government does not know about you when you enter the country and they are more than happy to use the information they have obtained about you for blackmailing. I believe having surveillance to monitor "suspicious" activities in the country are useful but not when it is going over the line of harassment -- distressing people from going on about their every days lives.

There is no need for Australia to be introducing new eavesdropping laws, because this is a step closer to what countries such as Iran are implementing on their citizens -- developing fear and eliminating the freedom of expression. I agree with the liberal Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami who said: "Freedom of expression and freedom of thought are the preconditions of a democratic society. But freedom does not mean chaos." (Iran 2005) -- Surveillance is required to monitor chaos but not to destroy democracy and freedom. Comment

Notes
[1] "amre beh maroof va nahi az monker", which became the rule for suppressing individuals' social rights and freedom of speech after the revolution in 1979.
[2] The rule to privacy is the 'ground rule' -- the boundaries which I believe authorities should never cross over
[3] Under Australian Federal Law it is an offence to intercept a communication passing over a 'telecommunications system' without the knowledge of the person making the communication. This is outlined in s 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1979.
[4] For example surveillance technology used to keep-out hackers from tracing credit card information online
[5] Encryption ensures that only authorised people have access to certain information, and will keep out any surveillance systems from monitoring or hackers from entering the system.
[6] Article 5.3.8 of the Rules and Regulations for Computer Information Providers
[7] Instead of simple video capturing, video will be presented in a form where the operator will feel they are in the same space as the activity is unwrapping.
[8] The company responsible for installing these cameras reported that a further 50 are to be installed throughout the country. I would say that the reason to such an increase to security especially outside Tehran is to monitor activities around the Nuclear plant in Natanz which is a small, some what rural town located near Tehran. As Iran has already identified that the plants (another one in Bushehr) are under surveillance by Israeli Satellite sending images to the US security force. Iran is one the countries with the highest security and policing in the world, as Norbain describes in their company (Company that installs the surveillance devices) leaflet "Police Station Security in Iran" that the country "is already probably the biggest police system in the world and will shortly double in size." (McCahill, M, Norris, C, Wood, D 2004)
[9] This method is currently being tested in Singapore.

References
1) Clarke, R 2001, While you were sleeping ... surveillance technologies arrived, The Australian National University, viewed 27 September 2006,
2) Freedom of expression on the Internet 2004, Human Rights watch, viewed 27 September 2006,
3) Gandchi, S 2002, Iran & Saudi Arabia: Monarchies & Islamism, viewed 27 September 2006,
4) Iran 2005, Human Rights Watch, viewed 27 September 2006,
5) Iran 2006, Reporters without borders, viewed 27 September 2006,
6)  Ireland, D 2005, 'They'll kill me' -- A gay Iranian torture victim speaks, Gay City News, viewed 27 September 2006,
7) McCahill, M, Norris, C, Wood, D 2004, The growth of CCTV: a global perspective on the international diffusion of video surveillance in publicly accessibly space, Surveillance & Society, viewed 27 September 2006,
8) Mansell, R, Silverstone, R 1996, Communication by design, Oxford University Press, New York.
9) McGrath, JE 2004, Loving big brother, Routledge, New York.
10) Moaveni, A 2005, Lipstick Jihad, Public Affairs TM, United States.
11) NICTA Queensland developing technology to make Australia safe 2006, National ICT Australia, viewed 27 September 2006,
12) O'Neill, M 2002, ASIC targets stock market Internet fraud, ABC Network, viewed 27 September 2006,
13) Pearson, M 1997, The Journalist's guide to media law, Allen & Unwin, NSW.
14) Pike, J 2000, Minstry of security SAVAK, Federation of American Scientists, viewed 27 September 2006,
15) Sedarat, F 2003, Iran Internet use at risk from conservatives, 16beavergroup, viewed 27 September 2006,
16) Surveillance laws and powers [no date], Electronic Frontiers Australia, viewed 27 September 2006,
17) The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000, In the public's interest: monitoring Australia's media, Reported by the Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies, Canberra.
18)  Traffic fee 2005, Iran Daily, viewed 27 September 2006,
19) Warren, C 2006, Phone tap laws threaten press freedom, Media Entertainment & Arts Alliance, Media Release, viewed 27 September 2006,