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 New dog or new tricks?
The end of Khatami era inevitably marks the end for Islamic
reformers
By Ramin Ahmadi
April 9, 2003
The Iranian
What is left of the Islamic reforms in Iran? Could
the Islamic reform agenda be revived under a different name using
new tactics? If it did, would it be a new dog or just new tricks?
The decidedly preposterous new proposal of "radical reforms"
heard echoing throughout certain intellectual quarters in and outside
of Iran would be unworthy of mention, were it not for its clear
reflection of the paralysis and political dementia that has afflicted
Iran's Islamic intelligentsia.
The radical reform agenda coalesced after the shock
of an unprecedented mass boycott of parliamentary elections by impatient
and desperate Iranians. A spontaneous collective action that sent
cold shivers down the spine of the spiritual leader, his gang of
Mafia bosses and their paramilitary support network. The negative
vote was another nail in the coffin of President Khatami's government
and its reform agenda. The drowning of Khatami became so apparent
that many apologists and reform ideologues started to jump ship.
Equally important to Khatemi's government was the
US invasion of Iraq, a war with clear implications for the reformists.
The US policy of appeasement towards Khatemi reformists and other
assortments of mellow Mullahs was over. A combatant ultra right
gang in Washington, energized by September 11 and its aftermath
was hard at work redrawing the maps of Middle East.
The new alignments did not bend enough to include
Islamic state sponsored terrorism with a human face. In fact, the
message was so clearly communicated, that religious reformists could
only envision two widely opposing alternative to the status quo
as far as US foreign policy was concerned. In their traumatized
and distorted view, US would either invade Iran or shake hands with
and make concessions to the right wing conservative rival. The reformists
could not envision any other US strategy since plans of supporting
them were abandoned.
In their rush to reinvent themselves and to rescue
the remnants of a bankrupt reform agenda the religious intelligentsia
has chosen to stay blind and deaf to the expressed will of an Iranian
majority that appears emboldened by the illegal and tragic US invasion
of Iraq. Such negligence is new for the Islamic reformers. Historically
they had listened to the plight of the masses, arguably more so
than their secular counterpart. It was, after all, a secular National
Front politician named Shapoor Bakhtiar, who tried to rescue the
previous regime from revolution in 1979.
No one from the Islamic front, including Nehzat Azadi
and other Islamists, would take the bait. They often knew the streets
and the popular sentiment and took great personal risks to express
it. It was none other than Mehdi Bazargan, who dared to write an
open letter to Khomeini asking him to end the bloody war with Iraq
at the time when the Imam was bent on removing Saddam Hussein from
power no matter the cost. It was also Bazargan and Nehzat Azadi
who first warned about the impossibility of sustaining the regime
after Khomieni's death. The present insensitivity is a clear break
from a tradition that strived to be in touch with the aspirations
of the people.
Apart from its historical context, the "radical
reform" proposal expressed thus far is vague and confusing.
The attempts to link such an agenda to more popular faces like Akbar
Ganji, the jailed journalist and outspoken author of The Republican
Manifesto, are in vain. Since his imprisonment most pro-Khatami
reformists distanced themselves from him and some openly criticized
him for going too far and throwing out the baby with the bath water.
Additionally, the position that Akbar Ganji has taken
visa vie the Islamic Republic, namely the disposal of the word "Islamic"
from "Islamic Republic" and an argument that an Islamic
Republic cannot be reformed is far from the aspirations of Islamic
reformers.
Even more problematic is the attachment of the word "radical"
to the allegedly new reformist agenda. The lack of a clear sense
of strategy and direction is evident when the "radical reform"
proposal is compared to that of Khatami and his strategist par excellence
Saeed Hajjarian.
Khatemi's reform agenda was based on two factors,
the grass root pressure from below expressed by people's vote of
confidence and gradual concessions imposed on the hard line leadership
from above by virtue of the presence of a popular President in the
power structure. It was understood that the resultant concessions
would progressively create wider openings and carry the system through
a democratic transition. Failure of this strategy is not a secret
to anyone today. But at least Hajarian had a strategy.
The "radical reform" proposal has no strategy
for dealing with the brutal paramilitary power structure. It hinges
on civil disobedience, mass protests, and strikes alone. This mass
resistance and confrontation is supposed to magically and non-violently
convince the power holders to agree with a reformist agenda.
It is not clear how the reform agenda is advanced
if the security forces continue to attack and destroy activists
as they did in the case of University of Tehran protest or respond
as usual with brutal beatings, tortures and mass executions. It
is even less clear why people would choose the "radical reform"
agenda and try to preserve a modified version of the regime if they
are successful in their mass action and can defeat the vicious paramilitary
forces in the streets by self-sacrifice. If history offers any lessons
here it is the misfortune of Shahpoor Bakhtiar, the last reformer
of the old regime. Once the security apparatus was dismantled the
mass movement that made him Prime Minister buried him along with
what was left of the Monarchy.
The "radical reform" proponents advocate
mass action but mass actions are successful when there is a clear
vision and alternative. The reformists cannot offer a vision without
Islam (As Ganji did from inside prison) and have no concrete plan
for dismantling a regime of corruption, torture, and execution.
Yet they expect people to take maximum risk and act in a revolutionary
fashion by taking to the streets (hence the word radical). They
expect people to pay a heavy price for an ambiguous outcome in which
the Islamic Republic survives and the paramilitary forces and spiritual
leader are allowed to follow a watch and wait strategy.
The "radical reform" agenda is based on
a number of dangerous assumptions. It presumes that a majority of
Iranians feel strongly about Islam and that Iranian's belief in
Islam translates into political support for an Islamic Republic
despite two decades of suffering. But most important and perhaps
most baseless of all these assumptions is that the Islamic Republic
can be reformed. To date we have no evidence to support such hypothesis.
We do know that the attempts at democratization of the Soviet systems
were the cause of the regime's demise and that not all despotic
regimes have been able to be reformed.
A febrile imagination and lack of reason characterizes
this latest adventure of Iranian religious intellectuals. It reminds
me of the brilliant description of Aramesh Doostdar in his landmark
study about Iranian culture, the Dim Luminaries (Derakhsheshhayeh
Tireh), where he describes "intellectuals born from the belly
of the clergy" and their toxic effect on our culture. But today,
there is no venom left in this particular snake.
The end of Khatami era inevitably marks the end for
the Islamic reformers. Their benign appearance, shallow propositions
and irrational agenda do little to ignite the imagination of the
younger generation. They do not pose a serious threat to the future
of a democratic Iran. Ironically this is the main accomplishment
of Khatami and company.
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