 The Triad
Russia-Iran-China
Reza Zia-Ebrahimi
July 3, 2002
The Iranian
The first impulsion toward the alliance between Iran on one side and Russia and China
on the other which is limited to a currently strategic connection rather than an
integrative system came from an Iranian need for a weapons' supplier during the Iran-Iraq
war and thus an unprecedented rapprochement took place between Tehran and Beijing.
After the war, some other common interests appeared between the two nations, including
Central Asia (and the question of other powers' influence) and later on the Taliban
threat. China, by shifting in the late 70's toward a developing liberal economy has
an urgent need for energetic supply and influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Iran
is a helpful bridgehead in this regard. Nowadays, China uses its ties with Iran to
influence US policies in other areas. For instance, when the US decided to sell F-16s
to Taiwan, China announced a transfer of M-11 missiles to Iran. During the same Iran-Iraq
war, Iran got closer to Russia, for the same pragmatic considerations (1).
The second important event was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which caused a great
malaise in a weakened Russian society. Questions about the new Russia, her role,
imperial designs, and tactical positioning in the new world order started to rise.
The first possibility consisting of a so-called "mature strategic partnership"
with the US failed. Russians wanted this partnership to be an equal-to-equal division
of world political and economic spheres of influence between the two great superpowers.
The problem was that Russia was no longer a great superpower and therefore a junior
partner. Russia was too weak and backward to be an equal partner to the US (2).
After this failure, the second option for Russia was the one related to her "near
abroad", which meant a sort of reconstruction of her political and economic
primacy over the space of the former Soviet Union. The holders of this school were
leaning towards past Russian geographic and cultural predominance over these states
and their political designs were guided by nationalist and almost mystical expressions
of Russia in terms of her place in the world and the region. This option failed too,
the former Soviet republics having grown anti-Russian (specially the Baltic States,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine) and seeking more economically competitive and interesting
partnerships with Europe, the US, or even Muslim countries.
At this time, in 1996, the nationalist and anti-American Evguenny Primakov replaced
the western-oriented Andrey Kozirev as foreign minister of Russia. Primakov's views
about expanding Russian sphere of influence through arms sales and energy exports
are today followed by President Vladimir Putin. Primakov foresaw the advantages of
an anti-hegemonic front constituted by Russia with the main power of the Far-East
and the most militant Muslim state.
However, the future of this connection is nothing more than uncertain being a necessary
alternative rather than a choice, especially for Iran. For the moment, it is a purely
strategic stance with a clearly expressed will to curtail American influence in the
region. But does each member of the triad have strong enough interests for the continuation
of this alliance?
 The first problem is that there is neither a common ideology, nor
ethnic, religious, or cultural familiarity between the three powers. The economic
benefits of the Russia-China-Iran triad remain very doubtful. Additionally, if Russian
nationalism desires to lead the alliance, it will be disappointed by the imminent
emergence of China as a commanding military, technologic, and economic superpower
which will not only surpass Russia but perhaps will wish to sacrifice the triad for
obvious economic benefits from the more industrialized world (especially the US and
its infallible ally, Japan).
In the post September 11 world, another stumbling block appears: the place of Iran
in this connection. The US, after having proved to those who were still doubting
that they were the main and unique superpower of the world by demonstrating an astonishing
rapidity in the success of their Afghani adventure, where the red Army failed (and
the fact that they no more need the help or the agreement of Europeans for these
kinds of operations) committed themselves in a rhetorical war with Iran ("sponsor
of terror", "axis of evil", etc.) Washington doesn't see any indulgence
toward Tehran in a favorable light. It is not clear anymore if either Moscow or Beijing
still have a strong enough interest in their alliance with Tehran. Iran can be a
costly friend. Due to US pressure, China has actually curtailed military cooperation
with Iran since 1997. The anti-hegemonic concept remains, but will it resist economic
pressure from the US?
The answer to that question is not as obvious as one would think. In spite of continuing
US protest since 1995, Russia kept on transferring nuclear technology to Tehran within
the framework of the Bushehr civil nuclear plant. Even the recent rapprochement between
Moscow and Washington after September 11 hasn't resulted in a significant change
in that policy.
There probably lies an insidious reasoning behind Russian aversion towards cooperation
with US despite its economic pressure. Perhaps it is only a will not to yield to
American directives because Soviet Empire's nostalgia and nationalism are still too
vivid. For anyone who has a slight idea of Russian nationalism, this factual state
doesn't need any further explanation. It seems advisable to notice a specificity
of American-Russian economic relation: after the failure of the "mature strategic
partnership" Russia no longer seeks a cooperative and exclusive economic link
with the US (which would imply political concessions), but rather an integrative
one with Europe. And Europe's position toward Tehran is much softer and continually
improving. These last weeks, EU-Iran ties have much strengthened. The EU is quite
angry about the Bush administration's attitude regarding trade with Europe (especially
the taxation of European steel) and doesn't seem inclined to follow US injunctions
concerning the proper attitude to adopt vis-á-vis Tehran. This can eventually result
in a definite open door for Russia to get even closer to her southern protege.
For Iran, the imperatives of her political and military ties with Moscow and Beijing
are much more vital. The Islamic Republic has a crucial need of arms supply for the
modernization of her army, her goals regarding acquirement of nuclear weapons and
her political weight in the region, where US backs Turkey, the Persian Gulf States
and Israel, and more recently Pakistan and Afghanistan, all of them being potential
military threats and politico-economic challengers. Being totally isolated by Washington,
Tehran sees the emergence of China as a possible help for the recovery of her international
stature. China is also an important political partner with her Security Council's
veto right and resistance to US hegemony.
 As long as Iran hasn't broken the ice with the US, her
geo-strategic interests definitely reside in the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing axis. Her
improving relation with the EU states (with which a political and trade agreement
is near) is also a step toward ending her international isolation. Russia and China
have both defendable and reasonable interests in this triangulation though they may
not seem imperative. Much depends on the attitude of the US. However, an aggressive
response from the US (which is very likely with the Bush administration, its war
against terrorism's rhetoric, and its imperial gestures) may generate an intensification
of this triangulation.
Notes
(1): Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold Green. Iran's
security policy in the post-revolutionnary era. RAND (National Defense Research Institute)
2001.
(2): Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic
imperatives. Basic Books, New York 1997.
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