Source: U.S. State Department

SUMMARY

Introduction
Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Iran

FULL TEXT

Introduction
The Year in Review
Africa Overview
Asia Overview
Europe and Eurasia Overview
Latin America Overview
Middle East Overview
Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1996
Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups
Appendix C: Statistical Review

Introduction

Terrorism in 1996 continued to cause grave concern and disruption in scores of countries. Combating this menace remains a very high priority for the United States and many other nations. But finding clear "patterns" in this form of political violence is becoming more difficult.

The Department of State's annual Patterns of Global Terrorism focuses primarily on international terrorism involving citizens or territory of two or more states. It also describes but does not provide statistics on domestic terrorism abroad, which is an even more widespread phenomenon. The number of international terrorist incidents has fallen, from a peak of 665 in 1987, to 296 in 1996, a 25-year low. Moreover, about two-thirds of these attacks were minor acts of politically motivated violence against commercial targets, which caused no deaths and few casualties.

Yet while the incidence of international terrorism has dropped sharply in the last decade, the overall threat of terrorism remains very serious. The death toll from acts of international terrorism rose from 163 in 1995 to 311 in 1996, as the trend continued toward more ruthless attacks on mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs. The threat of terrorist use of materials of mass destruction is an issue of growing concern, although few such attempts or attacks have actually occurred. Finally, domestic terrorism, in countries such as Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, appears to be growing and is more serious, in gross terms, than international terrorism.

It is clear, in any case, that the damage to society from terrorism is very high, and not just in terms of the dead and wounded. Terrorism, by definition, is aimed at a wider audience than its immediate victims. Terrorists proved again in 1996 that they can command a worldwide audience for their crimes and cause great disruption, fear, and economic damage. A dramatic truck bombing of the Al Khubar apartment complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in June killed 19 US airmen, wounded 240 other US citizens, and resulted in many other casualties. A series of suicide bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem by extremist groups aiming to destroy the Middle East peace process killed more than 60 and led to early elections and a change of government in Israel. And at the year's end, Marxist terrorists in Lima, Peru, grabbed the spotlight by seizing the Japanese Ambassador's residence and hundreds of hostages.

Terrorism by religious fanatics and groups manipulating religion, especially Islam, for political purposes continued to dominate international terrorism in 1996. Organized groups such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, that were behind the bus bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and the al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, which continued acts of terror in Egypt, remained active and dangerous. And freelance, transnational terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan and are backed by international terrorist financiers such as the Saudi dissident Usama Bin Ladin, are a growing factor. Ethnic terrorism in such places as Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Sri Lanka took a heavy toll, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party maintained its campaign of terror against Turkey.

Although the variety and complexity of terrorism and its dynamic quality are challenges to defining clear patterns, there has been a heartening trend among governments to condemn terrorism absolutely, irrespective of motive. One positive result of this growing policy of zero tolerance for terrorism is a decline in state-sponsored terrorism, although Iran, the primary state sponsor, has not been deterred. As terrorism becomes more global, cooperation among states is indispensable. President Clinton has given high priority to counterterrorism in our diplomatic agenda, and the United States consults with dozens of governments and participates in a growing variety of multilateral initiatives against terrorism.

Six international counterterrorist meetings were held in 1996:

The Philippines and Japan both hosted Asia and Pacific conferences on terrorism, the first of their kind in Asia. The United States participated in both. In March at the "Summit of Peacemakers," held at Sharm ash Shaykh, Egypt, and cohosted by President Clinton and President Mubarak, 29 delegations pledged to fight terrorism and to support the Middle East peace process. A follow-up Working Group of experts from these countries met thereafter in Washington. In April Peru hosted the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in Lima, which confirmed the principle that terrorism, regardless of political motive, is a serious crime. In July 1996 ministers of the G-7 and Russia met in Paris in response to a request from the G-7 summit in Lyon the previous year and endorsed 25 specific measures to improve security, prosecute and punish terrorists, tighten border controls, and prevent terrorist fundraising. They also called for a new international treaty outlawing terrorist bombings. The ministers also adopted further steps to protect mass transportation (both air and ground) and enhance law enforcement and counterterrorist capabilities in many areas.

The counterterrorist policy of the United States stresses three general rules:

First, make no deals with terrorists and do not submit to blackmail. Second, treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law. Third, apply maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions and by urging other states to do likewise.

The United States took several steps in 1996 to sharpen our tools against terrorism in this country and abroad. In April the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Among its many sections are a ban on fundraising in the United States by terrorist organizations to be designated by the Secretary of State, and improved means for excluding and deporting terrorists from the United States. Last August the President signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which imposes sanctions on foreign companies that invest in the development of Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources. The purpose is to help deny revenues that could be used to finance international terrorism.

The United States has trained more than 19,000 foreign law enforcement officials from more than 80 countries in such areas as airport security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. We also conduct a research and development program to use modern technology to defeat terrorists.

We can be proud of the successes we have achieved, but we cannot be complacent. Terrorism is a dynamic, moving target. Our defenses and deterrence mechanisms must be aggressive and flexible. As President Clinton declared in April: "We will never surrender to terror. America will never tolerate terrorism. America will never abide terrorists. Wherever they come from, wherever they go, we will go after them. We will not rest until we have brought them all to justice."

Legislative Requirements

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years, and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.

In 1996 Congress amended the reporting requirements contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires the Department of State to report on the extent to which other countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending, convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign governments are cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the amended legislation, the Department is submitting such information to Congress in a classified annex to this unclassified report.

Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant(1) targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.

Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this report. However, the report also describes, but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic terrorism.

Note

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those small groups-and their actions-that are the subject of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger context, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily international terrorism.

Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr. Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Footnotes

(1) For purposes of this definition, the term noncombatant is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following US military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or elsewhere.

Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism

The United States actively promotes international cooperation in condemning state sponsorship of terrorism and in bringing maximum pressure to bear against state sponsors. The Secretary of State has designated seven countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

Although US and international pressure has led to a decline in active state sponsorship of terrorism in recent years, more can and should be done to restrain those states that engage in terrorism themselves, or assist terrorists by providing sanctuary, arms, training, logistic support, financial backing, or diplomatic facilities. A range of bilateral and multilateral sanctions are in place to discourage these countries from continuing their support for international terrorism.

Cuba no longer is able to support actively armed struggle in Latin America or other regions of the world because of its severe economic problems. Although there is no current evidence that Cuba was directly involved in sponsoring specific acts of terrorism in 1996, it continues to provide safehaven for several international terrorists and maintains close ties to other state sponsors.

Iran, the most active state sponsor of terrorism today, continues to provide direction and support to terrorist groups, including Hizballah in Lebanon. Iran continues to assassinate dissidents abroad and also provides support to other terrorist groups that oppose Israel and the Middle East peace process. Iran has not withdrawn the fatwa against the life of Salman Rushdie.

Iraq's ability to carry out terrorism abroad has been curbed by UN sanctions. As events during 1996 clearly demonstrated, however, Saddam Hussein's regime continues to murder dissidents throughout Iraq and target foreign and local relief personnel in the northern part of the country.

Terrorism by Libya has been sharply reduced by UN sanctions imposed after the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 (1988) and UTA Flight 772 (1989). Libya still evades its obligation to hand over those indicted for these crimes.

Although North Korea cannot be conclusively linked to any international terrorist attacks since 1987, it continues to provide sanctuary to Japanese Red Army members.

Sudan was not directly involved in any acts of international terrorism in 1996 and took some positive steps to distance itself from its past support for terrorism. At the same time, Sudan continued to serve as a sanctuary and training center for several international terrorist groups. Moreover, it has not complied with the UN Security Council's demand that it turn over the three suspects implicated in the 1995 assassination attempt against President Mubarak.

There is no evidence of direct Syrian Government involvement in acts of international terrorism since 1986. The United States continues to urge Syria to banish terrorist groups that maintain a presence in Syria or in Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon. Until Syria does so, it will remain on the list of state sponsors.

Iran

Iran remained the premier state sponsor of terrorism in 1996. It continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts by its own agents and by surrogates such as Lebanese Hizballah and continued to fund and train known terrorist groups.

Tehran conducted at least eight dissident assassinations outside Iran in 1996. In May 1996 Reza Mazlouman, a government official under the Shah, was murdered in Paris by an Iranian resident of Germany with alleged ties to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The suspect was extradited to France by Germany. Seven other dissidents were assassinated by Iran in 1996 in Turkey and northern Iraq. Iran's primary targets are members of the regime's main opposition groups, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), as well as former officials of the late Shah's government who speak out against the clerical regime.

Iran continued to provide support-including money, weapons, and training-to a variety of terrorist groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It continued to oppose any recognition of Israel and to encourage violent rejection of the Middle East peace process. For example, Iranian Vice President Habibi met with HAMAS leaders in Damascus and praised their successful efforts immediately following the February bombings in Israel. HAMAS claimed responsibility for two more bombings in Israel the following week.

During a routine customs inspection of an Iranian vessel in Antwerp in March, Belgian authorities discovered a disassembled mortar-like weapon hidden in a shipment of pickles. The shipment was consigned to an Iranian merchant living in Germany. Iranian dissidents claim that the mortar was intended for use in an assassination attempt against Iranian exiles in Europe.

Testimony in the three-year-long trial of an Iranian and four Lebanese for the Iran-sponsored killing of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin's Mykonos restaurant in 1992 concluded in late 1996. German authorities issued an arrest warrant in March for Ali Fallahian, Iran's Intelligence Minister. In the fall, former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr and two other witnesses testified against Iran. In final statements in late November, German prosecutors charged Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iranian President Rafsanjani with approving the operation. (Guilty verdicts for four of the accused were announced in April 1997.)

Iranian leaders have consistently denied being able to revoke the fatwa against Salman Rushdie's life, in effect for nearly eight years, claiming that revocation is impossible because the author of the fatwa is deceased. There is no indication that Tehran is pressuring the 15 Khordad Foundation to withdraw the $2 million reward it is offering to anyone who will kill Rushdie.

In addition, Iran provides safehaven to elements of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and throughout Europe. Although Turkey and Iran agreed to a joint operation in mid-October to remove the PKK from the border region, Iran reportedly failed to cooperate in a meaningful way.

Iran's terrorist network in the Persian Gulf remained active in 1996. The Government of Bahrain announced in June the discovery of a local Hizballah group of Bahraini Shiites who had been trained and sponsored by Iran in an effort to overthrow the ruling al-Khalifa family.