Mapping Dean's Iran
Iranian Americans must mobilize
support for Dean's campaign
January 14, 2004
iranian.com
If the former Governor of Vermont Howard Dean becomes the next
President of the United States, what would be his administration's
policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran? Would he advocate a
regime change in Iran similar to what George Bush supports or,
as an ideological heir to the Clinton administration, would he
be satisfied with containment and track-two diplomacy?
Iran has been absent from Dean's brief foreign policy discussions
thus far. His campaign has focused on winning the Iowa and New
Hampshire primaries and establishing Dean as a front-runner. But
faced with increasing criticism from frustrated opponents with
more foreign policy experience, Dean went on the offensive and
began to elaborate on his national security policy.
Two days after
the capture of Saddam Hussein, Dean delivered his first national
security policy address in Los Angeles, stressing the importance
to US security of rebuilding America's international alliances
and partnerships. He formulated his national security doctrine,
a combination of military muscle and diplomatic initiatives designed
not only to win the war but also the hearts and minds of the alienated
European allies.
Despite resemblance of some of Dean's strategy to
that of the current administration, Dean's doctrine differentiates
itself by emphasizing "collective security". In sharp
contrast with the Bush administration's "go-it-alone
approach" Dean's focus on the collective interest and
objectives of the US and its allies is clear:
"We and our partners must commit ourselves to using
every relevant capability, relationship, and organization to identify
terrorist
cells, seize terrorist funds, apprehend terrorist suspects, destroy
terrorist camps, and prevent terrorist attacks. We must do even
more to share intelligence, strengthen law enforcement cooperation,
bolster efforts to squeeze terror financing, and enhance our capacity
for joint military operations -- all so we can stop the terrorists
before they strike at us".
This part of the doctrine, although useful in cases
such as Afghanistan and Iraq, is not applicable to Iran. It is
unlikely that any future
administration would pursue a military confrontation with Iran
despite abundant evidence that the Iranian regime actively supports
terrorist activities in the region. It is implausible that a policy,
which even the most hawkish in the Bush camp had to refrain from,
stands any chance of becoming the priority of a democratic president.
If Dean has a new policy toward Iran, the roots of
such new foreign policy must be found in the second component of
Dean's doctrine,
the emphasis on diplomatic initiatives and ideological warfare.
In his latest speech Dean provides several clues to what a Dean
administration may do vis-à-vis Iran:
"The next President will also have to attack the
roots of terror. He will have to lead and win the struggle of ideas.
Here we should
have a decisive edge. Osama bin Laden and his allies have nothing
to offer except deceit, destruction, and death. There is a global
struggle underway between peace-loving Muslims and this radical
minority that seeks to hijack Islam for selfish and violent aims,
that exploits resentment to persuade that murder is martyrdom,
and hatred is somehow God's will. The tragedy is that, by its
actions, its unilateralism, and its ill-considered war in Iraq,
this administration
has empowered radicals, weakened moderates, and made it easier
for the terrorists to add to their ranks."
There are many good reasons to believe this statement
could be a basis for Dean's future Iran policy. The great divide
between
moderate and radical Islam has been at the heart of Iran's
foreign policy debate for over a decade. In the eyes of some
Western observers, Iran's political scene is divided between
radicals
and moderates, the latter group being a potential ally of the
United States.
Others, citing the high rates of voter participation
in
various elections, claim that Iran is already a democracy
and normalization of the relations between the two countries will
consolidate the
democratization process. The recommended strategy thus becomes
one of appeasing the Iranian moderate faction or engaging
in
diplomatic initiatives that would purportedly strengthen
the hands of these
peace-loving moderates.
Rapprochement with the moderate Iran with good will
and an olive branch was the Clinton administration policy. The
track-two
initiatives
from small business and student exchange programs, to wrestling
and soccer games replaced substantial Iran policy and strategic
thinking. Much of Iran's involvement with regional and
international terrorism was ignored in favor of a constructive
engagement
with the moderates.
The policy however produced dismal
results. It
was, after all, Madeline Albright who issued a formal
apology about
the past US interventions in Iran, only to receive more
hostility and criticism from Tehran. The irony of that encounter
prompted
Iran's most popular satirist, Ebrahim Nabavi, to echo
the insanity of the regime in Tehran by writing: "Ms Albright
has no right to apologize! We will not allow her!"
The belief in the existence of a global struggle,
a great divide between peace-loving Muslims and a radical minority
is pervasive
among US policy makers and political analysts. Both
liberals
and conservatives carry this mantle of political correctness,
as it
appears to be the only alternative to the idea of a
war of civilizations between Islam and the West. This vision
may
help the Western
countries to positively engage their Muslim minority
but is least helpful
and often misleading in the case of Iran.
The "great divide" vision fails to see realities
of the Iranian political and civil society such as the
fundamental, cultural and religious differences between
Iran and the
Arab world, and the strong grass-root, pro-America,
secular movement
for democracy.
The main struggle in Iran has not been between the
moderate and radical version of Islam, but rather
between a secular
democratic
movement and the theocratic dictatorship.
Iran is
a country caught in a civil war between a majority who
demands
a nonviolent "regime
change" and a minority who resorts to violence
to stay in power. Moderates members of the clergy are not able
and in
most cases unwilling to bring about a democratic
change.
As a majority of Iranians looked to the United States
for moral and political support, US foreign policy
focused on constructive
engagement during the Clinton years and weapons
of mass destruction during the Bush administration.
Neither administration
prioritized
human rights and democracy.
US political and economic
pressure
on the Iranian regime was badly needed to redress
the balance of power in favor of democratic forces.
But
Bush's unilateralism
and military adventure in Iraq has significantly
damaged the US
credibility in the region making it increasingly
difficult to rally the Europeans behind the democratic
insurgency
in Iran.
The Iranian-American community can be confident
that the Bush administration is not concerned
about democracy
and
civil liberties
within the
US or abroad. Saddam's brutal suppression of
his opposition and other human rights atrocities became
an issue for
this administration only after all intelligence
and search missions
failed to produce
any evidence for the existence of WMDs in Iraq.
The Bush administration claims to support democracy
and
human
rights quickly dissipated
to business as usual when Moamar Al-Qaddafi,
the brutal dictator of Libya, "said uncle". Once Libya
opened
their weapon
sites for inspection, the President was quick
to boast about his new victory and promised all cooperating
dictators who
abandon their weapon program special benefits.
The clergy in Tehran took
careful notes. But so should those in the
Iranian American
community who care about democracy and human
rights in Iran.
The Iranian American community must mobilize
support for Dean's campaign. Whatever the faults
and shortcomings,
Dean's campaign
can be safely credited for being open to fresh
ideas and
responding to grass root supporters. The Iranian
American community has
significant money, numbers and influence in
states like California, Florida,
Texas, Illinois, New York, and certainly in
Washington DC. But our community must also get directly
involved in the
campaign so that Dean's Iran could be dramatically
different from that
of the Clinton administration.
Dean's campaign can benefit from the advice
and insight of Iranian democrats at a time
when foreign
policy
and the Middle
East are
high priorities and will
be a battle ground for both candidates next year. Dean
is the only candidate who can put democracy and
human
rights
on the Iran foreign policy agenda.
He is the only candidate who could revive
the old alliance with Europe, and convince
European supporters of the Islamic Republic to change their
policy and build a coalition for the advancement
of democracy
in Iran.
The Bush's road map
to peace in the Middle East has been nothing but a failure.
As Democrats we need fresh ideas, new visions
and
a different direction
in foreign
policy. We need
a road map to democracy for Iran. A long lasting peace
in the Middle East region will be difficult to
achieve
without
a democratic transformation in the Islamic
Republic. Author
Ramin Ahmadi is the associate clinical professor of medicine
at the Yale School of Medicine, the program director for internal
medicine residency at Griffin
Hospital and the founder of Griffin Center for Health and Human Rights. Since
1999, the center has conducted several Health and Human Rights projects in
East Timor, Nicaragua, Uganda and Guyana. In 1999, in East
Timor, he served as a consultant
to the Noble Laureate, Jose Ramos Horta, and established a clinic in Dili,
East Timor. During the war, in Feb 2000, he represented Physicians
for Human Rights
in Chechnya where he investigated and documented the human rights violations
which resulted in a book titled, Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya.
Ramin is the author of a book of poems, numerous articles and
short stories in Persian
and English. His latest article appears in the 2003 Yale University Press,
Yale Carriers Guide to Medicine.
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